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Case No. 20090061 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Jason Tyler Hamblin, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from four convictions: one for rape of a child, a first-
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402.1 (West Supp. 2009); one 
for sodomy on a child, a first-degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
5-403.1 (West Supp. 2009); and two for sexual abuse of a child, second-degree 
felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1 (West Supp. 2009). This 
Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009) (pour 
over provision).1 
1
 Citations are to current statutes, unless the relative section has been 
substantively amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1. Was Defendant's motion for new trial based on an alleged Brady 
violation properly denied, where Defendant knew the essential impeachment facts 
before trial, knew the full details during trial, and successfully used the information 
to obtain three acquittals? 
Standard of Review. The merits should not be considered, because Defendant 
fails to marshal the facts supporting the trial court's ruling as required by rule 
24(a)(9), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. See United Park City Mining Co. v. 
Stichting Mayflower Mountain Ponds, 2006 UT 35, f t 24-27, 140 P.3d 1200. 
Alternatively, a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial is upheld on appeal 
"absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f 31, 37 P.3d 1073 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Issue 2. Did the court's partial deferral of Defendant's rule 412 motion deny 
him confrontation, where without further ruling or objection, Defendant was 
allowed to fully question the victim and her brother Adam about Adam's prior 
sexual assaults on her? 
Standard of Review. The merits should not be considered, because the claim is 
not preserved and Defendant fails to marshal the facts. See State v. Patrick, 2009 UT 
App 226, | 12, P.3d ; United Park City Mining Co., 2006 UT 35, Iff 24-27. 
Alternatively, an evidentiary ruling will not be reversed on appeal "unless it is 
2 
manifest that the trial court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that 
injustice resulted." State v. Tarrats, 2005 UT 50, | 16, 122 P.3d 581. Whether an 
evidentiary ruling violated a defendant's right of confrontation is a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Clark, 2009 UT App 252, % 10, P 3 d . 
Issue 3. Did the trial court properly permit the Information to be amended to 
reflect the correct period that Defendant lived in the victim's family home, where 
the child-victim consistently stated that Defendant assaulted her when he lived in 
the home, but was confused as to her exact age? 
Standard of Review. The merits should not be considered, because the issue is 
not preserved and Defendant fails to marshal the facts. See Patrick, 2009 UT App 
226, 112; United Park City Mining Co., 2006 UT 35, | If 24-27. Alternatively, a trial 
court's decision to permit amendment of an information is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. See State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134,137 (Utah App. 1989); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 
4(d) (both recognizing trial court's discretion to amend information). 
Issue 4. Has Defendant established that his counsel was ineffective for not 
doing "something more" to preserve his appellate claims? 
Standard of Review. The merits should not be considered, because Defendant 
fails to adequately brief the issue as required by rule 24(a)(9). See State v. Green, 2004 
UT 76, | t 11-15, 99 P.3d 820. Alternatively, "[a]n ineffective assistance of counsel 
3 
claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Perry, 
2009 UT App 51, f 9, 204 P.3d 880. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following rules are reproduced in Addendum A: 
UTAH R. APPELLATE P. 24 - Briefs; 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 4 - Prosecution of Public Offenses; 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 24 - Motion for New Trial; 
UTAH R. EVID. 412 - Admission of Alleged Victim's Sexual Behavior or 
Alleged Sexual Predisposition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2006, Defendant was charged with one count each of rape of a child, object 
rape of a child, and sodomy on a child (R. 1-4). The information alleged that 
Defendant, an adult, sexually assaulted his nine- or ten-year-old stepsister M.B. in 
the family home (R. 3). The assaults included vaginal rape, anal rape, and object 
rape by inserting a 'Tight bulb or M & M container in M.B/s rectum" (id.). 
The information was amended before the preliminary hearing began (R. 56-
63; R64: 4). The charge of object rape based on use of a light bulb was deleted and 
all references to the light bulb omitted from the Information (R. 56-63). The 
amended information now alleged that Defendant raped M.B. by inserting an "M & 
M candy container and a 'dildo' in her anus" (R. 63). See Addendum B (First 
Amended Information). The charges were also expanded to include three counts of 
rape of a child, two counts of object rape of a child (based on the "M & M" container 
4 
and dildo), five counts of sodomy on a child, and four counts of aggravated sexual 
abuse of a child (R. 56-63; R64: 68-70). The probable cause statement explained that 
M.B. believed the assaults began when she was "approximately 9 years old, when 
she lived on Elm Street" and ended " when [Defendant] went to prison on unrelated 
charges, around the time [she] turned 10 years old in 2000" (R. 63). Defendant did 
not object to the amendments (R64: 4). After the information was amended, M.B. 
testified at the preliminary hearing and stated that Defendant used only two objects 
to penetrate her, an "M & M" container and a dildo (R64:16-17 & 32-33). Defendant 
was bound over for trial on the amended charges (R64: 68-71). 
Extensive pretrial discovery was requested and provided (R. 11-13,22-23,27, 
34, 39-40, 53, 70-79, 85-91, 215-216). It included reports and audiotape of an Idaho 
forensic interview, in which M.B. discussed Defendant's sexual assaults and 
disclosed that another brother, Adam, had separately sexually assaulted her (R217:4 
& 13; R415:137-41; R416: 25-26, 35-36, 55-56, 58-60). 
Defendant moved in limine to admit evidence of M.B/s disclosure that Adam 
also sexually assaulted her, pursuant to rule 412(b)(3), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, an 
exception to the rape shield rule (R. 92-103). Defendant acknowledged that rule 
412(a) precluded the defense "from going in to all the details of [Adam's] sexual 
abuse/7 but argued that he should be allowed to explore M.B/s disclosures to show 
bias and motive because her "disclosures of the allegations against [Adam] were 
5 
made in a manner that raise questions about the propriety of her accusations against 
the defendant and her motive for doing so" (R217: 42; R. 92-93). The prosecution 
opposed the motion (R. 113-117 & 202-211). 
The court granted the motion in part. It ruled that Defendant could generally 
question M.B. or other witnesses about her disclosures to show: (1) any bias M.B. 
harbored against Defendant or for Adam; (2) any material prior inconsistent 
statements M.B. made concerning the charged crimes; and (3) any matter the 
prosecutor opened the door to during direct examination (R217: 27-46; R. 265-267). 
See Addendum C (Oral & Written Rulings). The court stated that more specific rulings 
must wait until trial so that the relevancy of a question could be judged in context 
(R217: 27-30 & 41-46; R. 267). Defendant agreed, stating more than once that he felt 
" comfortable waiting to trial" for more specific rulings (R217: 28-30 & 42). Just 
before trial, the court's extensive oral ruling was reduced to a short written order 
(R217: 27-46; R. 265-267). 
Before trial, Defendant sought permission to introduce redacted police reports 
that showed that Defendant lived in New York State in 1999 and much of 2000, the 
time period that M.B. thought Defendant lived in the Elm Street family home (R. 
225-258). It was uncontested, however, that after Defendant left New York, he 
returned to Utah and moved into the Elm Street residence, where he lived until his 
arrest on an unrelated charge (R. 262; R64: 62-63; R416: 77 & 81-82). Consequently, 
6 
the prosecutor did not object to admission of the police records, but moved to 
amend the Information to correctly include the period that Defendant lived in the 
family home, i.e., through September 2001 (R. 259-264 & 339-340). Defendant 
lodged no objection and the end date in the Information was amended (R. 339-340 & 
344-347). See Addendum D (Second Amended Information). 
On February 27, 2009, a three-day jury trial commenced (R. 348-353). M.B., 
Adam, Defendant, and others testified. Eight counts were submitted to the jury (R. 
352-353; R416: 4-7).2 The jury convicted Defendant of one count of rape of a child, 
one count of oral sodomy on a child, and two counts of sexual abuse of a child (R. 
352-353 & 409-410). The jury acquitted Defendant of two counts of object rape of a 
child, one count of anal sodomy on a child, and one count of oral sodomy on a child 
(id.). On June 30, 2008, Defendant was sentenced to terms of fifteen-years-to-life 
imprisonment on each of the rape and sodomy convictions and one-to-fifteen-years 
imprisonment on the two sexual abuse convictions (R. 417-418). The four sentences 
were ordered to run concurrently to each other, but consecutive to a sentence 
Defendant was already serving (id.). 
On July 1, 2008, Defendant filed a motion for new trial, based on Brady v. 
Mcuyland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), allegedly that the prosecutor failed to disclose until 
2
 The handwritten notations in the Second Amended Information reflect the 
prosecutor's subsequent dismissal of three counts at trial (R. 344-347 & 352-353). 
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mid-trial that M.B. recanted her accusation that Defendant used a light bulb and 
failed to disclose that Adam, in fact, did this (R. 419-446 & 462-463). The prosecutor 
opposed the motion (R. 451-461). The court found that Defendant knew the 
essential facts as early as the preliminary hearing, knew the details at trial, and 
successfully used the impeachment evidence at trial (R. 477-485). Finding no Brady 
violation, the court denied the new trial motion (id.). See Addendum E 
(Memorandum Decision). Defendant timely appealed (R. 489-490). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Defendant recognized that his younger stepsister M.B. was a perfect victim 
(R416: 144). After M.B/s birth mother lost her parental rights, Defendant's 
stepmother, Christina, adopted the little girl and her brothers, Matt and Isaac (R414: 
159-162). But Christina, who was bipolar and a chronic alcoholic, hated M.B. (R414: 
117-118,162; R415:11, 48; R416: 48; 85 & 89). She singled out the little girl and, in 
Defendant's words, "persecuted" her (R416:85). She was extremely abusive to M.B. 
and frequently pulled her hair, slapped her, hit her with a brush, duct-taped her 
mouth closed, called her stupid, and treated her rudely and unfairly (R414:117-118 
& 162-164). She also did not believe M.B. and called her a liar (R415:113; R416: 93). 
3
 The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the jury's verdicts; 
conflicting evidence is included "only as necessary to understand issues raised on 
appeal." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, | 2, 55 P.3d 1131 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
8 
When M.B. was four or five years old, in 1994 or 1995, she told Christina 
about "something that [Defendant] had done in the past" (R415: 110-112 & 113). 
Christina said she was "lying" (R415:113).4 
When M.B. was six or seven, around 1996 or 1997, she told Christina that 
another brother Adam, Christina's biological son, was molesting her (R414: 50-51).5 
Adam, who was then about fourteen or fifteen years old, admitted to sexually 
touching M.B. and promised to stop, but sexually assaulted M.B. a "couple of more 
times" (R414:50-51; R416:48-49). Adam finally stopped abusing M.B. in 1999, when 
he was seventeen years old, because she told him to and because he felt guilty about 
what he had done (R415: 51; R416: 44 &48-49). Despite the sexual assaults, M.B. 
loved Adam: 
Adam and I, our relationship was not—he was my brother. He —we 
played video games. We wrestled. We did things. It wasn't all about 
that; like it wasn't all about what was going on with sexual abuse. I 
didn't hate him for it, because he wTas my brother, you know; like he 
was there more. He treated me with some kind of respect. 
4
 M.B. alleged that Defendant molested her when she was four years old (R64: 
19-21). The incident was not a charged offense and the trial court ruled that 
evidence of Defendant's prior bad act was too remote in time to be admissible (R. 
266). The fact that Christina did not believe her was admitted only to explain why 
M.B. did not tell her mother about Defendant's subsequent assaults. 
5
 Calculations of what year an event took place are primarily based on the 
witnesses' estimates of their ages. M.B. was born in June 1990 (R414: 159). 
Defendant was born in August 1980 and was ten years older than M.B. (R. 3). Adam 
was born in August 1982 and was eight years older than M.B. (R416: 44). 
9 
I guess what you would think it was, I didn't have anyone to go to. I 
had no one. I was always in my basement [bedroom], so I kind of 
figured that that was some kind of love, in a way. You know what I 
mean? Like, I know it's really weird to say, I know, but yeah, it was 
different. I mean Adam and me had a different relationship. 
(R415: 52-53). 
Adam's sexual assaults stopped before Defendant's sexual assaults began 
(R415: 21, 84-87,103; R416: 44, 49 & 85).6 
Christina and Defendant's father divorced around 1994 and Defendant 
moved to New York to live with his mother (R414: 118; R415: 7 & 9-10; R416: 46; 
R416: 74-75). In late 2000 or early 2001, when he was twenty or twenty-one years 
old, Defendant returned to Utah and moved in with Christina and her children, into 
a house she was renting on Elm Street (R414: 119-120, 165-166; R416: 82-83). 
Defendant's bedroom was in the basement, next to M.B.'s room (R414:125; R416: 
83). During the day, Defendant barely spoke to M.B., who was then ten or eleven 
years old (R414:124-125; R415:15 & 91). At night, he sexually assaulted her (R414: 
167-185; R415: 90 & 100-101). 
The first time, Defendant came into her room, woke M.B. up, massaged her 
back, and then turned her over and massaged her chest, over her night clothes 
6
 Defendant erroneously asserts that Adam abused M.B. before and after 
Defendant's charged crimes. See Br.Aplt. at 11 & 34 (citing preliminary hearing). At 
trial, M.B. clarified that this was not true and that Adam stopped abusing her when 
she was nine years old (R415:84-87). Adam also confirmed that he stopped abusing 
M.B. in 1999 (R416: 44 & 49). 
10 
(R414: 167-168). In later incidents, he massaged her chest, under her clothing, or 
massaged her when she was naked (R414:168 & 170). Eventually, he massaged her 
vagina (R414:169). When he touched her, she often saw or felt his erection (id.).1 
One night, he told M.B., "I wonder what it would feel like if you kissed me 
down there" referring to his penis, which was erect and exposed (R414:169). He 
then grabbed the back of her head and told her to "suck on it" (R414:184). She did, 
giving him "oral sex I guess you would call it" (R414:169). M.B. also thought he 
"lick[ed]" her vagina" more than once, but was unsure because the incidents "mush 
together sometimes" (R414:185).8 
M.B. alleged that Defendant inserted an "M & M" candy container into her 
anus and that another time he inserted a dildo (R414:171-177). She also alleged that 
Defendant committed anal intercourse by inserting his penis in her anus (id.).9 
Defendant vaginally raped M.B. multiple times (R414:177 & 179).10 The first 
time, Defendant spit on his hand and wiped the spit on his penis, but otherwise did 
7
 Defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of sexual abuse of a 
child (R. 344-347, 353 & 409-410; R416:130-132). 
8
 Defendant was convicted of one count of oral sodomy (her mouth on his 
genitals) and acquitted of one count of oral sodomy (his mouth on her genitals) (R. 
344-347,353 & 409-410; R416:132-133). 
9
 As will be discussed in Point I, the jury acquitted Defendant of all counts 
involving anal contact, that is, one count of anal sodomy and two counts of object 
rape (R. 344-347, 353 & 409-410; R416:133-135). 
11 
not moisten M.B. (R414:178). When he inserted his penis, it hurt M.B. so badly that 
tears were running down her face and she could not breathe (id.). She started 
bleeding, but Defendant did not stop (id.). Afterwards, he left the room without 
saying anything (id.). M.B. wiped the blood off herself, washed her bloody sheets in 
the basement laundry room, and turned her mattress over so no one would see the 
blood stain (R414: 178-179). The second time was pretty much the same, except 
Defendant rubbed her body more, but he still just "kind of rammed , / his penis into 
her (R414:180-181). 
When Defendant assaulted M.B., he "never said anything," but "shh" if she 
cried out in pain (R414:176 & 180; R415: 55). "Like, he would come in, and do his 
thing, and then go" (R414:180). Though Defendant and Adam committed some of 
the same sex acts on M.B., she felt there were significant differences between the 
assaults: 
Kind of awkward to say that Adam showed compassion. He did. He 
showed remorse, like he would stop if I said ''ow/' He wasn't forceful. 
He wasn't—we would talk; like not—you know, it was more verbal, 
you know, when that was going on. It was very different. It was more 
gentle and different. 
(R415: 54). 
[Defendant] never said anything to me. "Shh" was about the only 
thing he ever said to me. He didn't care. He got—he finished his 
10
 Defendant was charged and convicted of one count of rape of a child (R. 
344-347, 353 & 409-410; R416:135-136). 
12 
business and got up and left like I was a rag doll; like you know, like I 
was a used something or other; like, you know, just came and got his 
pleasure or whatever and left. And it didn't matter if he hurt me. He 
was just ruthless. 
(R415: 55). 
Defendant assaulted M.B. so frequently — every week or two weeks —that 
M.B. "became kind of numb" (R414: 177 & 180). To survive, she would "do 
something to take [herself] away from that, you know, to kind of not be there in a 
way," such as thinking "about being somewhere else; just being happy, you know; 
just kind of detach myself I guess you would call it" (R414:180). 
She hated Defendant and wanted the assaults to stop, but felt she was alone: 
I hated him. I just— it's like — I felt very alone, that I couldn't even go 
to my own mother; because she wouldn't believe me, or that —you 
know, I don't know. I just felt really alone, and I hated him. And, you 
know, he asked me for favors, like "run out to my truck and get this." 
And I'd run out to there and to that, and —or just stuff around the 
house, like get him water from the water cooler and stuff like that. 
And I remember that. And I always did it, for some reason. I was just 
scared of him, I guess is what you would say. 
(R414:185). Though M.B. did not tell Christina about the assaults, she told her aunt 
that Defendant was touching her and that she was physically afraid of him (R415: 
116-117). The aunt told Christina. Christina said M.B. was lying and just wanted 
attention (R415:117). The aunt "didn't know what [she] should do," so she "just 
dropped it at that point" (id.). 
13 
M.B/s brother, Matt, who was a teenager at the time, once saw Defendant 
leave her bedroom late at night (R415: 7 & 15). Matt thought this was strange, 
because the two had littler interaction during the day, but Matt told no one (R415:15 
& 36-37). Years later, when M.B. told him Defendant assaulted her, Matt felt guilty 
for not protecting his younger sister and attempted suicide (R415:16-17). 
Adam also once saw Defendant leave M.B/s room late at night (R416: 50). 
Adam asked M.B. what Defendant was doing in her room (id.). She said he "was 
doing stuff and 'bothering7 her," which was the code word Adam "used when [he] 
talked about [his] abuse of her" and "left no question in [his] mind as to wha t she 
was talking about" (id). But Adam "didn't say anything at the time, to protect 
[himself]" (id). 
Defendant's assaults on M.B. stopped only when he moved out of the Elm 
Street home in 2001 (R414:123-124 & 186-187; R416: 84). M.B. initially believed she 
was nine when the assaults started and ten years old when Defendant left (R414: 
186; R415: 64-65). But based on when her nephew was born and the evidence of 
when Defendant moved back to Utah, M.B. realized that she must have been a bit 
older, ten or eleven years old, when the assaults occurred (R414: 165-166 & 186; 
R415: 65-66 & 70-71). She explained that though she was unsure of her exact age, 
she knew that Defendant assaulted her when they lived on Elm Street, after he 
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returned from New York (R414: 165-166). She wTas equally sure that the assaults 
stopped only when he moved out of the house (R414:186-187). 
A few months after Defendant moved out, Christina, M.B., and her younger 
siblings moved to Montana (R414: 126 & 187). M.B. was about twelve or thirteen 
years old and, by her own admission, 'Very promiscuous/' into drugs, and out-of-
control (R414:187-188). When M.B. was fifteen years old, her mother Christina died 
(id.). At some point, the juvenile authorities placed M.B. in a Montana teenage 
group home (R414:189; R415: 52). There, she told a therapist that Defendant had 
repeatedly sexually assaulted her (R414:189; R415: 52,55, & 57). M.B. thought the 
police were informed, but they never contacted her (R415: 57-59). 
M.B. was transferred to a teenage group home in Idaho (R415: 53-54). She 
received psychological treatment and filled out treatment packets that required her 
to detail Defendant's assaults (id.). One packet discussed the destructive effect of 
keeping sexual abuse a secret, which made M.B. realize that she needed to also 
disclose Adam's assaults (R415: 53-54 & 57-58). She did not want Adam to go to jail, 
but, nevertheless, told her therapist that Adam sexually assaulted her (id.). 
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A child forensic specialist interviewed fifteen-year-old M.B. in April 2006 
(R415: 122-123 & 133).n The interview began with a discussion of the new 
disclosures concerning Adam (R415:127-128,135-136, & 160-162). Midway through 
the interview, M.B. began discussing Defendant's assaults (R415: 160-162). She 
described in detail and drew a picture of how Defendant inserted a Christmas tree 
light bulb in her anus and said, "Oh shit/7 when he thought he lost it (R415: 75-81, 
154-156). Only later, after she completed the forensic interview and filled out 
additional treatment packets detailing Adam's assaults, did M.B. realize that it was 
Adam who had inserted the light bulb into her, not Defendant (R415: 79-81). She at 
some point informed the prosecutor of her mistake. The light bulb charge was 
dropped and all references to a light bulb deleted from the Information (R. 56-63; 
R415:107-108). At the preliminary hearing, M.B. testified that Defendant used only 
two objects: a "little, mini M & M tube" and a dildo (R64:16-17, 32-33, & 68-70). 
The police interviewed Adam. He admitted that he had sexually assaulted 
M.B. when she was younger and disclosed much, but not all, of his criminal 
conduct. He revealed nothing about Defendant's assaults (R416:33-39,50-51, & 58-
11
 The interviewer testified at trial and was questioned about a report she 
made summarizing the interview (R415:132-174 & 188-204). Although the report 
was preliminarily marked as an exhibit to facilitate her examination, the report was 
not admitted into evidence (R425: 137-41 & 182-186; R416: 8-18, 70-73, & 95-109). 
Defendant erroneously cites to and quotes from the report, as if it had been 
admitted. See Br.Aplt. at 8. 
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59). Adam was charged, pled guilty, and was sentenced (R416: 54). Adam 
subsequently testified in this case to seeing Defendant leave M.B/s room, to M.B.'s 
statement that Defendant was "bothering" her, and to his own sexual assaults on 
her (R416: 48-68). 
At trial, Defendant denied sexually assaulting M.B. (R416: 85-86). He testified 
that he had little if anything to do with the younger child (R416: 92). He provided 
no explanation for her allegations (R416: 79-93). His attorney, however, argued, in 
opening and closing, that all the sex acts M.B. described really occurred, only Adam 
committed them, not Defendant (R414: 106-112; R416: 145-146). The attorney 
speculated that M.B. falsely accused Defendant because she did not care for him and 
wanted to protect Adam from going to jail (R414: 111; R416:150-151). 
The jury disagreed. They found M.B. credible and convicted Defendant of 
rape, sodomy, and two sexual abuses (R. 409-410). Presumptively, because M.B. 
confused the light bulb incident, the jury acquitted him of three charges involving 
anal penetration or contact (id.). And based on her equivocation about Defendant 
licking her vagina, the jury also acquitted him of one count of oral sodomy (id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's appeal should be summarily rejected because, below, he failed to 
preserve most of the issues now raised and, on appeal, he fails to comply with 
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appellate marshaling and briefing requirements. Even if the merits were considered, 
Defendant establishes no error or prejudice. 
Allegation of Brady Violation. The trial court properly denied Defendant's 
motion for new trial after it found that the prosecutor had not suppressed material 
impeachment evidence. 
As early as the preliminary hearing, the defense knew that M.B. no longer 
alleged that Defendant anally penetrated her with a light bulb and knew that the 
charge was dropped. In the same hearing, the defense learned that Adam anally 
raped M.B. in a way similar to Defendant. In light of this evidence and the defense 
theory — that M.B. was really assaulted, but by Adam, not Defendant—the trial court 
correctly found that Defendant knew or reasonably should have known before trial 
that Adam likely anally raped M.B. with a light bulb. 
At trial, M.B. and Adam testified that he used a light bulb to anally penetrate 
her. The trial court rejected Defendant's assertion that he was "blindsided" by this 
information and correctly found that, even if arguendo Defendant did not know the 
details until trial, he knew the essential impeachment facts before trial and used 
these facts to shape his trial strategy. That strategy successfully resulted in 
acquittals on three counts involving anal contact. Based on these facts, the trial 
court correctly found that no Brady violation occurred. 
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Rule 412: Evidence of Adam's Abuse of M.B. Rule 412 was never invoked to 
bar Defendant's cross-examination of M.B. or any other witness. Nevertheless, 
Defendant claims that the trial court's failure to fully rule on his rule 412 motion 
before trial denied him confrontation. According to Defendant, the failure to fully 
rule prevented him, in his open statement, from specifically referring to M.B.'s 
recantation concerning the light bulb incident and from referring to Adam's 
assaults. The claim has no merit. An opening statement does not implicate 
confrontation. Witness examination does. Her, no limits were placed on that 
examination. 
The trial court ruled that Defendant could explore M.B.'s bias, motive, and 
material inconsistencies and opined that if the questions were "artful," preclusion 
under rule 412 could be avoided. The court properly deferred any more specific 
ruling until trial, so that the questions and objections could be judged in context. At 
trial, no further ruling was sought and no rule 412 objections were made. Instead, 
Defendant freely questioned M.B. and other witnesses about her bias, motive, and 
material inconsistencies, and also about the details of Adam's sexual assaults on her. 
In sum, no confrontation issue exists. 
Amendment of Information. The trial court properly permitted the 
Information to be amended to correctly reflect the period Defendant lived in the 
family home. M.B. consistently accused Defendant of sexually assaulting her after 
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he moved into the Elm Street family home, but she was mistaken as to her precise 
age when this occurred. Other evidence established the correct time period. 
Defendant did not oppose the amendment below and claims no prejudice from it on 
appeal. 
Alleged Ineffectiveness of Counsel. Defendant fails to establish that his 
counsel was ineffective for not doing "something more" to preserve his appellate 
arguments. The only deficiency that Defendant alleges is that his trial counsel 
should have moved for a mid-trial continuance to better preserve his Brady issue. 
The trial court did not procedurally bar the Brady claim, however, but fully 
considered its merits. Consequently, Defendant cannot establish prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE NO BRADY VIOLATION 
OCCURRED, WHERE DEFENDANT KNEW THE ESSENTIAL 
IMPEACHMENT FACTS BEFORE TRIAL, KNEW THEIR DETAILS 
DURING TRIAL, AND USED THE INFORMATION TO HIS 
ADVANTAGE 
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion for new trial, based on an alleged Brady violation. See Br.Aplt. at 21-34. 
According to Defendant, the prosecutor "made a calculated decision" to " willful [ly] 
and deliberately]" conceal M.B.'s recantation that Defendant inserted a light bulb 
in her anus and conceal that Adam, in fact, did this. Br.Aplt. at 21 & 23. Defendant 
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alleges that concealment of this impeachment evidence until mid-trial prevented 
him from making a better opening statement, prevented him from effectively 
confronting MB., and prevented him from "asserting his best defense until the trial 
was half over/7 Br.Aplt at 22 & 29. The argument lacks merit. 
* * * 
Due process requires that a prosecutor disclose evidence favorable to the 
defense. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) (due process requires 
disclosure of evidence that "would tend to exculpate [a defendant] or reduce the 
penalty"); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (due process requires 
disclosure of material impeachment evidence). "[Prosecutorial nondisclosure of 
information favorable to the accused does not by itself constitute prejudicial error 
requiring reversal of a conviction. . . . Rather, nondisclosure violates due process 
under Brady only if the evidence at issue is material and exculpatory, and if the 
defense did not become aware of the evidence until after trial." State v. Bisner, 2001 
UT 99, \ 36,37 P.3d 1073. Evidence is material "if 'there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different/" Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, \ 29, 128 P.3d 1123 
(quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995)). 
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Accordingly, courts universally refuse to overturn convictions where 
the evidence at issue is known to the defense prior to or during trial, 
where the defendant reasonably should have known of the evidence, 
or where the defense had the opportunity to use the evidence to its 
advantage during trial[.] 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, | 33. 
The merits of Defendant's Brady claim should not be considered, however, 
because Defendant fails to comply with this Court's marshaling requirement. In 
any case, the trial court correctly found that no Brady violation occurred, because 
Defendant knew of the impeachment evidence before and during trial and used it to 
his advantage. See Add. E. 
A. The merits should not be considered, because Defendant fails to 
marshal the facts supporting the denial of the new trial motion. 
Rule 24(a)(9), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, requires Defendant to 
"marshal all record evidence that supports" a challenged finding or fact-dependent 
ruling. See Add. A. Proper marshaling requires Defendant to amass "every scrap of 
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences that support the adverse decision and 
then show why that evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
decision, is legally insufficient. United Park City Mines v. Stichting Mayflower 
Mountain Ponds, 2006 UT 35, \ 24,140 P.3d 1200; State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT 
App 191, f 20, 186 P.3d 1023. To accomplish this, Defendant must embrace the 
State's position: 
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[Appellants] are required to "temporarily remove their own prejudices 
and fully embrace the adversary's position"; they must play the 
"devil's advocate/7 In so doing, appellants mus t . . . not attempt to 
construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case . . . [and must 
not] merely re-argue the factual case presented in the trial court. 
United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, \ 26 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). When an appellant fails to properly "perform this critical task, [the 
appellant court] can rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's findings of facts" 
and legal ruling. Id. at \ 27. 
Here, Defendant fails to comply with rule 24's marshaling requirement. 
Indeed, he never acknowledges it. Consequently, his Brady claim may be 
summarily rejected. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 40,114 P.3d 551. 
For example, Defendant asserts that the trial court's finding that Brady was 
not violated is wrong because "the court failed to recognize that the light bulb 
testimony was not a mere retraction of a prior allegation, but an admission that it 
had happened at the hands of Adam." Br.Aplt. at 27. Defendant also claims that the 
trial court erroneously rejected that he was "blindsided by the testimony that came 
in the middle of the defense's cross-examination of [M.B.]." Id. The facts, when 
properly marshaled, do not support these assertions. 
The marshaled facts establish and the trial court correctly found that the 
prosecutor did not suppress material impeachment evidence and that Defendant 
was aware of the impeachment facts as early as the preliminary hearing (R. 477-482). 
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See Add. E. The original information charged one count of object raped based on the 
light bulb incident. See Statement of Case at 4-5. Before the preliminary hearing 
began, this charge was dropped and replaced with two charges of object rape based 
on Defendant's alleged use of an "M & M" container and a dildo. See id. & Add. B. 
The probable cause statement was also amended to delete reference to use of a light 
bulb and to allege use of the "M & M" container and dildo (id.). When M.B. testified 
at the preliminary hearing, she stated that the only objects Defendant used on her 
were an "M & M" container and a dildo (R64:16-17 & 32-33). In the same hearing, 
M.B. testified that Adam anally raped her in a manner "similar" to Defendant (R64: 
50). 
These facts establish that Defendant knew of M.B/s recantation long before 
trial and that he reasonably should have known that, if Defendant did not use a 
light bulb, Adam likely did. This is especially true where Defendant never claimed 
that M.B. fabricated a sex act. To the contrary, the defense conceded that M.B. was 
sexually assaulted as she described (R414: 106-112). See also Br.Aplt. at 21. The 
defense claimed only that she falsely accused Defendant of these crimes to protect 
Adam, who committed them (id.). 
Other record facts, ignored by Defendant, support the trial court's finding that 
Defendant knew the essential facts for impeachment before trial. In the pretrial 
hearing on the rule 412 motion, defense counsel informed the court that M.B. had 
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accused Defendant of anally penetrating her with a light bulb and had drawn a 
picture showing how the light bulb had been inserted (R217:12-13). Defendant told 
the court that in the preliminary hearing, M.B. denied that Defendant did this (R217: 
12-13). Defense counsel also stated, "Adam has acknowledged all this [referring 
generally to the sex assaults]. Adam is not disputing this. So, you also have a 
situation where Adam is saying, 'yeah, that's what I did; I did all this'" (R217:17). 
The court asked defense counsel if the defense theory was that Adam, not 
Defendant, committed all the sex assaults (R217: 31). Defense counsel responded, 
"I'm trying to be coy with the prosecutor and the court so I can be somewhat 
prepared at trial, but it's not—it's obvious, because of the way in which everything 
was disclosed, obviously; specifically certain allegations" (id.). 
Defendant's failure to acknowledge these facts and their reasonable inferences 
justify summary rejection of his claim. Additional marshaling failures will be 
discussed with the merits. 
B. Alternatively, the trial court correctly found no Brady violation 
and properly denied the motion for new trial. 
If the merits are considered, the trial court properly denied the motion for 
new trial because Defendant failed to establish a Brady violation. 
As previously discussed, when the facts are properly marshaled, they 
establish that at the preliminary hearing, Defendant knew that the light bulb rape 
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charge was dropped and that M.B. no longer claimed Defendant did this. He also 
knew that Adam anally raped M.B. in a manner //similar// to Defendant. See 
discussion, supra. And he knew that despite the similarity of some of the sex acts, 
M.B. viewed Adam and Defendant differently: 
Adam and [Defendant] are very different. They did the same things, a 
lot of the same things. But the way they did it, they were very 
different. Adam showed emotion. If I said "ouch," started crying, he 
stopped. [Defendant] had no emotion. He just did what he did and 
left. . . . I feel Adam was man enough to admit what he did, so I have 
more forgiveness for him. 
(R64: 45-46). In his opening statement at trial, defense counsel told the jury that the 
sex offenses M.B. described really happened, but were committed by Adam, not 
Defendant (R414:106-112). Counsel stated that M.B. vindictively accused Defendant 
because she "didn't give a darn about" him (R414: 111). He told the jury that M.B. 
previously accused Defendant of a specific sex act that she had described in great 
detail, but that she later said, "No, he never did anything like that" (R414:108-111). 
These facts belie Defendant's assertion that he was prevented from arguing 
his "best defense" in opening, that is, that "[M.B.] had been systematically abused 
by Adam, but had made up the 'mean and uncaring7 abuser allegations against 
[Defendant] to protect Adam." See Br.Aplt at 21. Instead, the facts fully support the 
trial court's finding that the defense knew the essential impeachment facts as early 
as the preliminary hearing and "carefully planned his case for trial by focusing on 
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the 'discrepancy between the complaining witness' initial disclosures and her 
testimony at the preliminary hearing" (R. 481) (Add. E.). 
Defendant claims that the court's finding is erroneous because the 
"concealed" information was not only M.B/s recantation, but also that Adam 
committed the crime. Br.Aplt. at 27. More facts, again unacknowledged by 
Defendant, demonstrate that he knew or should have known before trial that Adam 
committed the crime. 
In pretrial discovery, Defendant sought and obtained police reports of 
Adam's investigation and prosecution (R. 39-40). He also obtained other reports of 
Defendant's assaults that included within them information on Adam's assaults 
(R64: 51-55).12 
In a 2006 police interview, Adam admitted much of his abuse of M.B., 
including that he had anally raped her by inserting objects into her (R416:33-36). At 
~ Defendant insinuates that the prosecutor tried to block his access to Adam's 
investigative reports. See Br.Aplt. at 9-10. The record proves otherwise. Defendant 
requested Adam's records. When the prosecutor failed to timely produce them, 
Defendant moved to compel their discovery, but then withdrew the request and 
informed the court that the parties had settled the matter (R. 41-46 & 53). 
Defendant likewise asserts that "[w]e know that the State also changed its 
approach in mid-trial, from objecting to any evidence of Adam's abuse to calling 
him as a State's witness." See Br.Aplt. at 32. Again, the record is otherwise. The 
prosecutor told the defense before trial that he intended to call Adam as a witness in 
its case-in-chief (R. 341-342). Moreover, during trial, the prosecutor never objected 
to questions about Adam's assaults. 
27 
trial, defense counsel asked the interviewing detective if he had specifically 
questioned Adam about the light bulb incident: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you specifically asked [Adam] if he had ever 
stuck a light bulb in [M.B/s] rectum. 
DETECTIVE: Yes. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you asked him that because, is it fair to say, the 
information that you reviewed in preparation for Adam's report 
indicated that Adam had done the light bulb issue. 
DETECTIVE: Yes. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: There wasn't any information in the reports that 
you reviewed, prior to these interviews with Matt and Adam, that 
indicated [Defendant] had did [sic] the light bulb issue. 
DETECTIVE: Not to my recollection, no. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: But you are aware of [the forensic interviewer's] 
report where she has in her report that [M.B.] said [Defendant] did it. 
DETECTIVE: Yes. . . . 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: But it sounds like you wanted — at least you wanted 
to follow up on the information about Adam doing it, and that's why 
you asked him. 
DETECTIVE: Yes. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And he denied it. 
DETECTIVE: Yes. 
(R416: 35-36). This exchange evidences defense counsel's pretrial knowledge that 
information existed that suggested that Adam, not Defendant, used the light bulb. 
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And though Adam may have initially denied this in 2006, no one but Adam and 
Defendant were implicated in M.B/s assaults. 
When Adam testified, he agreed that he had not disclosed all of his sexual 
misconduct in the 2006 interview. He believed, however, that he did disclose the 
light bulb incident, but concealed a different incident involving "a hypodermic 
needle and Novocain" (R416: 50-51 & 58-60). In the 2006 interview, he also did not 
disclose what he knew of Defendant's abuse of M.B. (R416: 58-60). 
A week or two before Defendant's trial, Adam was re-interviewed by a 
different detective (R416: 59-60). This 2008 interview occurred after Adam was 
convicted. Adam discussed all of his sexual misconduct and revealed that M.B. told 
him Defendant was "bothering" her (id.). Though Defendant claims that the 
prosecutor concealed this second interview until trial, see Br.Aplt. 24, Defendant's 
trial counsel specifically referred to it in his opening statement: 
This time, the interview takes place February 20th, 2008, seven days 
ago. It is conducted by Sgt. Travis Peterson. Sgt. Peterson is a sergeant 
with the DA's office. He interviews Adam, and he also interviews 
another lady by the name of Jody. 
(R414: 107). These facts support that Defendant was fully aware or should have 
been fully aware before trial that Adam likely anally raped M.B. with a light bulb. 
See Tillman, 2005 UT 56, % 40 (recognizing Brady not violated if defendant knows of 
undisclosed report prior to trial). See also United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 573 
29 
(4th Cir. 2009) ("[Wjhere exculpatory information is not only available to the 
defendant but also lies in a source where a reasonable defendant would have 
looked, a defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the Brady doctrine") (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413,417 (6th Cir. 
2007) (" [T]here is no Brady violation... if the information was available to him from 
another source"); United States v. Coplen, 565 F.3d 1094,1097 (8th Cir. 2009) ("The 
government does not suppress evidence in violation of Brady by failing to disclose 
evidence in which the defendant had access through other channels.") (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
In any case, as the trial court correctly found, regardless of whether 
Defendant was fully aware of these facts before trial, he was fully aware of them at 
trial and had a fair opportunity to use them to his advantage (R. 480-483). Indeed, 
the defense impeached M.B. sufficiently that the jury acquitted him of the three anal 
penetration counts. See Statement of the Case at 7; Statement of Facts at 17. See also 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 33 (holding no Brady violation established where "the defense 
had the opportunity to use the evidence to its advantage at trial"). 
Defendant claims that the trial court found the Brady issue was unpreserved 
and denied the new trial motion, because defense counsel failed to seek a mid-trial 
continuance. See Br.Aplt. at 20 & 40. The claim lacks merit. The trial court did 
correctly note that Defendant's post-verdict claim of being "blind-sided" was belied 
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by his failure to claim surprise and seek a continuance during trial (R. 481). 
However, the trial court did : I deny Defendant's Brady claim because ___ 
continuance was sought (R. 480). The court instead considered this fact with the 
totality of other facts in i tiling on the merits (R. 480-485). See State v. Workman, 635 
surprise). . 
The court also noted, in addressing the materiality of the evidence, that it did 
not constitute direct impeachment of a charged offense (R. 483-484). Thus, even if 
the defense "had labored throughout the trial under the illusion that the victim had 
continued to mistakenly attribute the light i^.r incident . • [i /vionddrij, :he jury 
• . - i ^ - , : ^ . - K . \ . - - . t . : . . - :•-...-, . <.l-jiii^v,\iU't\y »i - 4 x > - i 8 4 ) . 
l "c-rKCVJ-MV •. ! - ' - ' : . - r n i ! ! i ^ ' M \ i - " ^ i v i / . i . M
 v ; - . > • f -V ;*<-, l o - • • ] i o t 
prejudicial (R. 484-485). See Eisner, 2001 UT 99,138; Pinder, 2005 UT15, ^ 33 (both 
holding no Brady violation where impeachment evidence not material). 
In sum, Brady was not violated and a new trial was not warranted. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S PARTIAL DEFERRAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
RULE 412 MOTION DID NOT DENY HIM CONFRONTATION, 
WHERE HE WAS ALLOWED TO FULLY QUESTION M.B. AND 
ADAM ABOUT ADAM'S ASSAULTS 
Defendant claims that his right of confrontation was violated when the trial 
court failed to fully grant his motion iii limine to admit evidence pursuant to rule 
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412, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. Br.Aplt. at 34-37. Defendant alleges that the lack of a 
''full ruling" prevented him from presenting his "best defense" in his opening 
statement and, thereby, denied him confrontation. Id. 
The issue should not be considered, because it is not preserved. The merits 
should also not be considered, because Defendant fails to marshal the facts 
supporting the trial court's decision to partially defer its ruling. Moreover, 
Defendant fails to accurately relate what subsequently occurred at trial. 
Alternatively, if the merits are considered, confrontation arises only in the context of 
witness examination, not opening statement. Here, Defendant was allowed to fully 
confront both M.B. and Adam about Adam's assaults and was allowed to elicit more 
details of those assaults than permitted under rule 412 or its exception. In sum, no 
confrontation issue exists. 
* * * 
Rule 412(a), the rape shield rule, bars admission of a victim's past activities 
"that involve actual physical conduct that imply sexual intercourse or sexual 
conduct." State v. Tarrats, 2005 UT 50, | 22, 122 P.3d 581 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Clark, 2009 UT App 252,114, P.3d 
(same). In adopting rule 412, the Utah Supreme Court "recognized and agreed 
with the general consensus among courts that an alleged victim's prior sexual 
conduct 'is simply not relevant to any issue in the rape [or other sexual crimes] 
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prosecution/" Tarrats, 2005 UT 50, ^ 21 (quoting advisory note) (other citation and 
internal quotations omitted). Even where such evidence may be marginally 
relevant, it may still be excluded under rule 403, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, given its 
""unusual propensity' to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the Jury and . 
"distort the j ui v 's deliberative process.'" Tarn its, 2005 1 J 1 50, If 21 (quoting ad v isory 
note) (other cil ai ion and ii il ernal qi :iol ai ion marks omitted) See also Clark, 2009 UT 
App 252, Tf 14 (same). 
Rule 4 i 2 'safeguards the alleged victim from the invasion of privacy [and] 
potential embarrassment associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual 
details L . . I. L , . , .12 Advisory Committee Nuu\ i^ aliording victims 
nv\ "C:::'>!. :• - . • ' . ; :- .•"• . 'k' > c >.\ , -.M ; u^ . . i a^ivb v :- i.i:. -^  vi >c\.:di HUM. V:
 : J u / t 
: * • ^ ' ; ^ i * s1'- . •/::" ; • - '. : i " - y- v -v..; J X S agairy * .iM-v.< '-.j otl<^ J«M • ' ' f. 
The rule's protections apply whether the sexual behavior evidence is "offered as 
substantive evidence or for impeachment/' Id. 
Subsection 412(b)(3) provides an exception to the rule. Subsection (b)(3) states 
that specific instances of a victinVs sexual behavior are admissible, where the 
evidence i s "otherwise admissible ui ider these r i iles[, ai id its exclusion] w ould 
vio late the cv: ::!:;- : ' ••- .f ri--.hi- • ; ir - v n - J ..- " ^ .^ .' A ^M^d Jiff<-r -ntlv, 
before evidence of a victim's sexual behavior may be admitted under the exception, 
a defendant must "demonstrate both that the evidence was not prohibited by any 
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other rule of evidence and also that its exclusion would violate his constitutional 
rights. Clark, 2009 UT App 252, f 15. 
Here, Defendant claims his Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation is at 
issue. A defendant's right of confrontation —the right to present evidence and 
confront witnesses —"is not without limitation" and must necessarily "bow to 
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." See Michigan 
v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145,149 (1991) (discussing confrontation in context of state rape 
shield statute) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Clark, 2009 
UT App 252, f 16 (same). The right "guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 
whatever extent, the defense might wish," Delaware v. Fensterer, A74t U.S. 15, 20 
(1985). Consequently, under the Confrontation Clause, "[tjrial judges retain wide 
latitude to limit reasonably a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine a witness 
based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of 
the issues." Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
See also UTAH R. EVID. 403. The right of confrontation is violated, however, if a court 
prohibits a defendant from "'engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination 
designed to show a proto-typical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby 
to expose the jury to the facts from which [it] . . . could appropriately draw 
inferences relating to the reliability of the witnesses.'" Clark, 2009 UT App 252, f^ 16 
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(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,680 (1986)) (brackets and omission in 
original). 
The merits oi Defendant's confrontation claim shun id not be considered, 
:•'_*! „;Li-j me i — .:f ::- :.. . ; :u-cr\ou .;; : trie facts are not marshaled, i:\en :t :he 
:^^.-;[c: v---- ••->id'T-"/ i '"I'ePv'i VT: .\ -< a;* • : \ - . "•* :' / ^ ry . ". ..-1 • ,- . : r .; 
more. He not only engaged in appropriate cross-examination to show M.B/s bia s, 
motive, or inconsistency, but was also allowed to elicit details of M.B/s sexual 
behavior far beyond what is permitted under rule 412 or its (b)(3) exception. 
A. The merits should not be considered, because the issue is not 
preserved and the facts are not marshaled. 
Defendant moved in limine to admit evidence ui M.D - U/^/o forensic 
interview, in which she discussed Defendant's and Adam's assaults (R. 92-103). 
Defendant recognized that rule 412 prohibited him from introducing details of the 
victim's sexual behavior with Adam, but argued that he should be allowed to 
questi- := • ;.:>. ..^  oin an\ • • ..s, native, or inconsistency f kl I . 4_:.;. •*_:-- • . :\c trial 
( • • • • t agreed.. The coin t n ileci that Defendant • could generally cross-examine M.B. 
and other witnesses about M.B/s bias, motive, and material inconsistencies (R217: 
27-46). See Statement of the Case, supra. 
Beyond this, the court explained that it needed to wait until trial to rule on 
more specific rule 412 objections because questions and objections concerning M.B/s 
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disclosures had to be evaluated in context (R217: 27-30 & 41-46). The court opined 
that it believed that questions could be artfully framed to avoid rule 412's 
prohibitions and still probe the areas Defendant wished to examine (R217: 45-46). 
Defendant agreed and stated more than once that delaying further ruling until trial 
was appropriate (R217: 28-30 & 42). Just before trial, the court's extensive oral 
ruling was reduced to a short written ruling (R. 265-267). See Add. C. Because 
Defendant did not object to the court's deferred handling of the rule 412 motion, he 
may not challenge the lack of a "full" pretrial ruling for the first time on appeal. See 
Patrick; 2009 UT App 226, f^ 12 (affirming failure to preserve below waives 
consideration of merits on appeal). 
The merits should also not be considered, because Defendant fails to marshal 
the facts surrounding the rule 412 motion. See United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 
35, %^ 24-27. Defendant does not marshal significant procedural facts —that he 
agreed with the deferred ruling and did not seek further ruling at trial. He also does 
not marshal significant substantive facts — that he was permitted to freely cross-
examine M.B. and Adam about Adam's assaults and elicited details of M.B.'s sexual 
behavior beyond that permitted by rule 412 or its (b)(3) exception. 
Specifically, Defendant fails to acknowledge the following facts. In his 
opening statement, defense counsel explained the defense theory— that M.B. 
truthfully described her abuse, but falsely accused Defendant to protect Adam, who 
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committed the crimes. See discussion, supra. Defense counsel told tl le jui \ tl iat M.B. 
"doesn't give a darn about" Defendant and lh.it her .leeiisatkms wvrv "old-
fashioned vindictiveness" (R414: 111). The second time the defense referred to M.B's 
sexual behavior with Adam was in cross-examining Matt, M.B/s brother. Defense 
counsel asked Matt what he knew of Adam's abuse of M.B. and Matt replied, Adam 
"got in trouble years and years before, back hi \\V>t \ alley when [Defendant] was 
* • :- a a!" :' - • . vu>^-v *u\v i d^koo *..-•:; .--. nat occurred and Matt said 
LhdL Aao- - - o \i ;; -, . •-- . - rv:ely (R41 5: 22-24). C »'i i re •: N tl: le defense 
again asked Matt what Adam did to M.B. and, again without v r-\i\ tiuii, Matt 
responded: "Adam would go in [M.B/s] room and like touch her with his hands, 
and that he would like masturbate at the same time while touching her" (R415: 42). 
Following this testimony, the prosecutor asked M.B, if Adam, ever touched 
her sexually (R415: 50) 1 1 lis vv as 1 1 le first ti n le tl iat the prosecutor referred to 
Adam's abi ise, Withoutpro\ iding the detai Is of w 1 iat. \dai i 11 tad doi i.e to 1 t.ei , M.B. 
replied that Adam abused her when she was six or seven, that M.B. told her mother, 
that Adam stopped, but then touched her again "a couple of times'7 before he finally 
stopped (R415: 50-51). M.B. explained that Adam and Defendant never sexually 
assaulted her at the same Lrvie (is. 4 i 3. ;>_!. See also Statement of Facts at 10 & n.6. The 
prober =. : . •-• • *. a d>./ ad; dM ;.» -,, eiu a;i\ .uiiuivnces between Adam's and 
Defendant's assa -\l< ,::• d again w e - ». \ vov-...:*••- ; he^^ •- d detail-. V : edited 
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what she felt were the differences, i.e., Adam's compassion and Defendant's 
ruthlessness (R415: 52-55). See also Statement of Facts at 9 & 12-13. 
On cross-examination, defense counsel extensively questioned M.B about her 
prior allegation that Defendant inserted a light bulb into her anus (R415: 75-83). 
Though the trial court had ruled that Defendant could question M.B. about material 
inconsistencies regarding the charged crimes, the light bulb incident was not a 
charged crime (R217: 43-44). Nevertheless, without obtaining a further ruling or 
incurring additional objection, Defendant questioned M.B. in detail about her prior 
accusation, including the drawing she made of the incident (R415: 75-83). Defense 
counsel further questioned M.B. about her preliminary hearing statement that 
Defendant used only two objects to penetrate her, an "M & M" container and dildo 
(R415: 79 & 109). M.B. asserted that she knew the defense would question her about 
this discrepancy and she was prepared to explain it (R415: 79-81). She said that 
sometime after she made the original accusation in the forensic interview, she 
worked on treatment packets that forced her to detail Adam's abuse (id.). In the 
course of doing that, she realized that it was Adam who inserted the light bulb into 
her, not Defendant (id.)}3 
13
 M.B. told the prosecutor and, as a result, the light bulb object rape charge 
was dropped from the Information before the preliminary hearing. See Statement of 
Case at 4-5; Statement of Facts at 16. 
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Defense coii -n <, ,\^rir\. -» <• ier JcLiiis of Adam's 
assaults- son t.e that were discussed i 1 t. the forensic ii iterview and some tl iat w ei e 
not. No objections were raised to this questioning. Defense counsel asked M.B. if 
Adam also inserted a dildo in her anus and how many times he did that (R415: 81-
82). M.B. described what he did (id.). Defense counsel asked M.B. if Adam had 
performed oral sex on her and she said he had (R415: 90). Defense counsel asked if 
-M'- .iu-i j^cTi,-:v.i.v. ;Tcii sex on Adam and >!..>. said siienad (id.). Defense counsel 
(R415: -)1). She explained that ' J .- *: ! .. J * \ -M- \ ,u;r \\\\ ; -:p-- h - - :P it 
Defendant "took [her] virginity" (R415:91). Defense counsel asked her if Adam had 
inserted his fingers into her rectum and she said he had (R415: 91-92). 
During an ensuing lunch recess, the court informed counsel that a juror had 
SL;LVHULC i a question — a procedure the court allowed — asking why !\ LB. j\c nut tell 
U- ,;i:lM.;. ,!' . •-! ^.L1 .-: *.:. \ . i LU :->•! .:c-."-.\.- V. * i\4: i - »2i. 
The answer was that years before, Christina had called M.B. a liar whei t, M.B. said 
Defendant molested her. See Statement of Facts at 9 & n.4. The defense objected to 
this answer because the prior bad act had been deemed irrelevant and inadmissible 
in the pretrial rule 412 hearing (id.). The court reminded defense counsel that the 
defense hc-d r-.v:: ^v\>j]\ «.•-. uii- ;,.Li::;-.^ in questioning M.B.: 
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We have left open the issue what this court's rulings might be on 412 
objections, and no one has made one. So, we've gone fast and far past 
what otherwise might be protections entitled to [M.B.] pursuant to rule 
412. 
(R415: 112). Defense counsel agreed (id.). The court stated that accordingly, the 
prosecutor should have "some leeway" in questioning M.B. about why she did not 
tell Christina (zd.).M 
After the jury returned, the prosecutor asked M.B. why she did not tell and 
she responded that Christina had called her a liar when she had "told on 
[Defendant], about something that happened in the past"(R415:113). Throughout 
the rest of the trial, defense counsel continued, without objection, to question 
witnesses about M.B.'s and Adam's sexual behavior (R415:171; R416:28-29,33-37, & 
58-60). 
In sum, Defendant did not object to the court's deferred handling of the rule 
412 motion, therefore, the issue is not preserved. Defendant also fails to marshal the 
facts concerning the rule 412 motion, pretrial ruling, and related trial evidence. 
These failures justify summary affirmance. 
14
 Defendant wholly mischaracterizes the bench conference. He states that it 
addressed "what questioning would be allowed regarding allegations against Adam 
and [M.B.'s] differing attitudes toward Adam" and Defendant. Br.Aplt. at 16-17 & 
29-30. 
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B : \ lternati \ - ely, no denial of confrontation occurred. 
Defendant claims that -the trial court's failure to make a "full" pretrial :n ilirig 
on his rule 412 motion deprived him of confrontation. Br.Aplt. at 34-37. He asserts 
that the court's failure to fully rule deprived him of the opportunity to make a better 
opening, which would have led to a better defense. Id. at 37. The claim has no merit. 
:.-. viy.i : .>f confrontation "guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal 
proses
 kJv\; ' u " ,":'1 - \ :::-o>ses dguii:-; . i -.'it-. . onzales, 
2005 UT 72, \ 4b, 125 P.3d s~S <,...-.< i :" - • •v!:c/.--i- ^ - \;N ;* :I:-.;T 
U.S. Const, amend. VI)). An opening statement does not implicate the right. 
In any case, here the gist of the defense theory was fully stated in opening. 
See supra at 26. During the ensuing trial, Defendant was allowed to question M.B. 
about any bias or motive she had to falsely accuse Defendant. And, as discussed, he 
wasab-^i icv "* - o x ^ -ne \I.i> .»::.i-. ii-ior^'. ip—L^LOiU .ming any inconsistency 
in her statements. Defendai if: was a] so allowed to full> qi lestion M.B arid other 
witnesses about Adam's assaults and, without limitation, to elicit details of M.B/s 
sexual behavior. See discussion of marshaled facts, supra. In sum, the predicate for a 
rule 412(b)(3) confrontation claim does not exist, because evidence of M.B/s sexual 
behavior was not e \auaed . 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITED THE DATES IN 
THE INFORMATION TO BE AMENDED 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 
prosecution to amend the end date of the charged period from December 2000 to 
September 2001. See Br.Aplt. at 37-39. See also Add. B&D (Informations). Defendant 
claims the nine-month change was "not justif [ied]" because M.B. was "unequivocal" 
that she was "nine, or perhaps had just turned ten" when Defendant began 
assaulting her. Id. The merits of the issue should not be considered, because the 
issue is not preserved and the facts are not marshaled. Alternatively, it lacks merit. 
A. The merits should not be considered, because the issue is not 
preserved and the facts are not marshaled. 
Defendant claims he objected to the amendment below. Br.Aplt. at 37. He did 
not. He filed no written objection to the prosecutor's motion to amend the 
information and there is no other evidence that he objected (R. 339-340). 
Consideration of the merits is, therefore, waived. See Patrick, 2009 UT App 226, Tf 12. 
Even if the issue were preserved, Defendant fails to marshal the facts 
supporting the trial court's ruling. Instead, Defendant summarily asserts that M.B. 
"changed her story [of when the crimes occurred] only when it became apparent if 
she continued to claim she was nine, she must be lying." See Br.Aplt. at 39. Though 
unacknowledged by Defendant, the marshaled facts prove otherwise. 
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When the facts su}^\MLii\;iiK truh \r- :- m ^ K - }•-• >p.. • iy !^a;--h^:-\: ihey 
establish that the probable cause stat*-^'1" • i1-::' / • o. , \ i 
Informations stated that the sexual assaults occurred in the Elm Street family home 
(R. 1-3 & 56-63). M.B. testified at the preliminary hearing that she thought 
Defendant moved into the home when she was nine or had just turned ten, i e., 1999 
or Z '*?i -: Ko4: -'. \ *• • <: _4~_j
 ;. \ Lsridi: R .^ : >. .- oider sister, testified at the preliminary 
/ h \ . >i w\ :i\..i : \ :••: t.;..:;. ; ' *"K'\.I\ ^ L I L ^ L ... •:::• :vi J : . ' lv . ;; . J px'S.-u\ „ p a r t 
produced police records that supported Mariah's recall of the dates and showed that 
he still lived in New York in 1999 and much of 2000 (R. 225-258). Defendant also 
agreed that after he left New York in late 2000 or early 2001, he moved to Utah and 
shortly thereafter moved into the Elm Street family home (R416: 81). 
"J • v- .To-WLur: .v- L.\->*--d in- -•
 t, L- .v :; i .^  .» *\ "i roa:izea the;: sr;e must 
have been a year older, eleven years-old when Defendant li\ ed ii itl tehoi ne (R. 260). 
The prosecutor then moved to amend the end date charged in the Information to 
correctly reflect the time period that Defendant lived in the home (R. 259-264 & 339-
340). Defendant did not object to the pretrial amendment (R. 339-340). Defendant's 
failure to mar-ru-ii tnese racts supports summary rejection of his claim. See United 
Park City Mining Co., 2006 1 1 1 35, %*k 24-27. 
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B. Alternatively, the Information was properly amended. 
Alternatively, the claim has no merit. Rule 4(d), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, permits an information to be amended "at any time before verdict if no 
additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant 
are not prejudiced/7 See Add. A. 
Time is generally not a statutory element. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 
(Utah 1985). And children are often unreliable in recalling dates in describing 
events that occur over a period of time. See State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40,f 12,116 P.3d 
360; State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1033 (Utah 1991); Robbins, 709 P.2d at 773. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish these cases because M.B. testified at the 
preliminary hearing that she was sure she was nine or ten when the assaults began. 
See Br.Aplt. at 39. The argument is of no avail. In the same hearing, M.B. testified 
that the assaults took place after Defendant left New York and moved into the Elm 
Street home (R64: 9, 20 & 23-24). This is exactly the type of "temporal reference 
point" that children can more reliably identify than a precise year or an exact age. 
Robbins, 709 P.2d at 773. 
Nor does it make any difference that M.B/s realization that she must have 
been older resulted in part from Defendant's "alibi/' See Br.Aplt. at 39. The purpose 
of "notice-of-alibi" statutes is to "preven[t] "last minute surprises and enable[e] the 
prosecution to make a full and thorough investigation." State v. Masetas, 815 P.2d 
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i v^ . , - - ^ I L : .:. ,\L';\ ;- .. .:=,: ;: : hat investigation results in amendments in the 
charges, tho-L- i v-^-': ' ^ ' ; - "• • p^i: nissible becau se a defei idant '1 las no si -at i itory 
or constitutional right to a charge framed so as to facilitate an alibi defense.'" State 
v. Northcutt, 2006 UT App 269,1f 17,139 P.3d 1066 (quoting Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1033) 
(brackets in original). 
Defendant7^ claim of error also fails because he does allege prejudice. See 
Br.Apt:* at i', - ;^. See also UlAli K. • ! . u. i\ • * *i; (amendment permissible unless 
-u: '-u " J, :,>i :*: : -.-• " ••- kvd. \J^\ -J •, \is>. : Vie- • -K- •: i \ \ IT 
der.i-^-•' • ,: '•• • • '• ' • : - ^ v - ^ . v j l J t - M \ M• v /> , r v - ! ' - . .•.-!'*? M-- h *• >->; h o c ' :i rp f> ! MVV 
that he did not assault her. Under this theory, M.B/s exact age was of little import. 
See Taylor, 2005 UT 40, \ 5 (recognizing where defendant denies crime, change in 
time frame of allegations does not violate his substantial rights). 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT HIS TRIAL 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
, Defendant asserts that i f any issue is foui id to be unpreserved, theproced i iral 
default should be excused, because his trial counsel was ineffective "for not doing 
something more/7 See Br.Aplt. at 40-41. The issue should be summarily rejected for 
inadequate briefing. See Green, 2004 UT 76, W 11-15. 
"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate 
botl I that 'com tsel's perfoi mance was deficit•:; - .-: /:L .-.MOW an objective 
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standard of reasonable professional judgment/ and that 'counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial/" State v. Perry, 2009 UT App 5 1 , f 1 1 , 204 P.3d 880 
(quoting Litherland, 2000 UT 76, If 19 & citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984)). A reviewing court "'must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Benvenuto v. State, 2007 
UT 53, t 19,165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). "[A]n ineffective 
assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can 
be surmised from counsel's actions." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah App. 
1993). 
Moreover, "proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative 
matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 
(Utah 1993). To establish prejudice, a defendant must affirmatively establish that 
"'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182,188 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "And as with the 
first prong of the Strickland standard, there is a 'strong presumption' that the 
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outcome of the particular proceeding is reliable/7 Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, *f 23 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S: at 699). 
Though both prongs of the Strickland standard must be established, both need 
not be analyzed. In resolving an ineffectiveness claim, "an appellate court may skip 
to the second prong of the Strickland standard and determine that the 
ineffectiveness, if any, did not prejudice the trial's outcome/7 State v. Goddard, 871 
P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 
Ignoring this authority, Defendant simply presumes that any failure to 
preserve an issue is necessarily deficient and prejudicial. See Br.Aplt. at 40-41. This 
wholly fails to satisfy the briefing requirements of rule 24(a)(9) and justifies 
summary rejection of the claim. 
In any case, Defendant's appellate issues have no merit, see Points I-III, supra, 
and, consequently, any failure of counsel to preserve them cannot be prejudicial. 
The only specific deficiency Defendant identifies is that his counsel failed to seek a 
mid-trial continuance after it became "clear . . . that the State had failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence,77 that is, after M.B. revealed "the misattribution of the light 
bulb incident/7 Br.Aplt. at 40. The trial court did not rely on defense counsel's 
failure to seek a continuance to bar the Brady claim. The court simply noted that 
counsel had not claimed surprise and sought a remedy during trial (R. 481). The 
court then proceeded to fully consider the merits of the Brady claim before rejecting 
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it (R. 477-487). See Point I, supra, & Add. E. In sum, seeking a mid-trial continuance 
would not have changed the Brady ruling and, therefore, no prejudice exists. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted November 2, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
Utah R. App. P. 24. Briefs 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order indi-
cated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be 
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other 
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of 
the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the perti-
nent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an adden-
dum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceed-
ings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in 
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of 
the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the is-
sues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall 
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum 
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not 
reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opin-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
ion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; 
and 
(a)(l 1)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such 
as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the 
court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, 
except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may 
refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-
appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the 
reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs 
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court, 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a mini-
mum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designa-
tions used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such 
as "the employee," "the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequen-
tial number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits 
shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or re-
jected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs 
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases 
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be 
deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to 
file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to 
the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which 
shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
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(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause shown may upon 
motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity 
the issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A 
motion filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking 
more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the mo-
tion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of the 
court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or appel-
lee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply 
briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party 
after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the 
clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the 
Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference 
either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state the 
reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be 
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically ar-
ranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess 
attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 4. Prosecution of Public Offenses 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a person 
having reason to believe the offense has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted by using the 
name given to the offense by common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense 
sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement 
of facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things as time, 
place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such 
things as money, securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or 
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be identified without setting forth a copy. 
However, details concerning such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law 
nor matters of judicial notice need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time before verdict if no additional or 
different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indict-
ment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent prose-
cution for the same offense upon the same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a defendant of the nature and cause 
of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill 
of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the court 
may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be 
amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as justice may require. The request for and contents 
of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the essential elements 
of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name contained therein may be incorrectly 
spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained in the statute creating or defining 
the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning unless they are otherwise defined 
by law or have acquired a legal meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was based shall be endorsed thereon 
before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on 
application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, 
furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear before the magistrate. Appearance 
may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural person. 
Current with amendments received through July 1, 2009. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 24. Motion for New Trial 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if 
there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall be accompanied by affida-
vits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 10 days after entry of the sentence, or within such further 
time as the court may fix before expiration of the time for filing a motion for new trial. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had been held and the former verdict 
shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in argument. 
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Utah R. Evid. 412. Admissibility of Alleged Victim's Sexual Behavior or Alleged Sexual Predisposition 
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involv-
ing alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c); 
(1) evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and 
(2) evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition. 
(b) Exceptions. The following evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible under these rules: 
(1) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other 
than the accused was the source of the semen, injury, or other physical evidence; 
(2) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of 
the sexual misconduct offered: 
(A) by the accused to prove consent; or 
(B) by the prosecution; and 
(3) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant. 
(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility. 
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under paragraph (b) must: 
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose 
for which it is offered unless the court, for good cause, requires a different time for filing or permits filing dur-
ing trial; and 
(B) serve the motion on all parties. The prosecutor shall timely notify the alleged victim or, when appropriate, 
the alleged victim's guardian or representative. 
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule, the court must conduct a hearing in camera and afford the alleged 
victim and parties a right to attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing must be 
sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders otherwise. 
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Third Judicial District 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ROBERT G.NEILL, 8439 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-







Assigned to: R. Neill (Tuesday) 
DAO# 06019648 
AMENDED 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 061907251FS 
The undersigned under oath states on information and belief that the defendant 
committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 402.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, had sexual intercourse with a child 
under the age of 14 years at the time of the offense. 
COUNT II 
RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 402.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, had sexual intercourse with a child 
under the age of 14 years at the time of the offense. 
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RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 402.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, had sexual intercourse with a child 
under the age of 14 years at the time of the offense. 
COUNT IV 
OBJECT RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 402.3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, caused 
penetration of the genital or anal opening of a child who is under the age of 14 years by 
any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, with intent to cause substantial 
emotional or bodily pain to the child or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person. 
COUNT V 
OBJECT RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 402.3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, caused 
penetration of the genital or anal opening of a child who is under the age of 14 years by 
any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, with intent to cause substantial 
emotional or bodily pain to the child or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person. 
COUNT VI 
SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a 
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the 






SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a 
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the 
actor or the child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either 
participant. 
COUNT VIII 
SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a 
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the 
actor or the child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either 
participant. 
COUTN IX 
SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a 
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the 
actor or the child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either 
participant. 
COUNT X 
SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a 
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the 






AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm 
Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about Jamuary 1, 1999 through 
December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(4), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a 
party to the offense, touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a 
female child, or otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take 
indecent liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial 
emotional or bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger 
than 14 years of age, further that the defendant did during the course of committing the 
Sexual Abuse of a Child use or threaten the victim by the use of a dangerous weapon, or 
used force, duress, violence, intimidation, coercion, menace, or threat of harm or the 
Sexual Abuse of a Child was committed during the course of a kidnapping, or caused 
bodily injury or severe psychological injury to the victim during or as a result of the 
offense, or the defendant was a stranger to the victim or made friends with the victim for 
the purpose of committing the offense, or the defendant used, showed, or displayed 
pornography or caused the victim to be photographed in a lewd condition, or the 
defendant has been previously convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving a 
sexual offense, or the defendant committed the same or similar sexual act upon two or 
more victims at the same time or during the same course of conduct, or the defendant 
committed, in Utah or elsewhere, more than five separate acts which if committed in 
Utah would constitute an offense described in Title 76, Chapter 5, and were committed at 
the same time, or during the same course of conduct, or before or after the instant 
offense, or the defendant occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim, or 
the defendant encouraged, aided, allowed or benefited from acts of prostitution or sexual 
acts by the victim with any other person or sexual performance by the victim before any 
other person, or the defendant caused the penetration, however slight, of the genital or 






AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm 
Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about Jamuary 1, 1999 through 
December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(4), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a 
party to the offense, touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a 
female child, or otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take 
indecent liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial 
emotional or bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger 
than 14 years of age, further that the defendant did during the course of committing the 
Sexual Abuse of a Child use or threaten the victim by the use of a dangerous weapon, or 
used force, duress, violence, intimidation, coercion, menace, or threat of harm or the 
Sexual Abuse of a Child was committed during the course of a kidnapping, or caused 
bodily injury or severe psychological injury to the victim during or as a result of the 
offense, or the defendant was a stranger to the victim or made friends with the victim for 
the purpose of committing the offense, or the defendant used, showed, or displayed 
pornography or caused the victim to be photographed in a lewd condition, or the 
defendant has been previously convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving a 
sexual offense, or the defendant committed the same or similar sexual act upon two or 
more victims at the same time or during the same course of conduct, or the defendant 
committed, in Utah or elsewhere, more than five separate acts which if committed in 
Utah would constitute an offense described in Title 76, Chapter 5, and were committed at 
the same time, or during the same course of conduct, or before or after the instant 
offense, or the defendant occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim, or 
the defendant encouraged, aided, allowed or benefited from acts of prostitution or sexual 
acts by the victim with any other person or sexual performance by the victim before any 
other person, or the defendant caused the penetration, however slight, of the genital or 






AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm 
Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about Jamuary 1, 1999 through 
December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(4), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a 
party to the offense, touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a 
female child, or otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take 
indecent liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial 
emotional or bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger 
than 14 years of age, further that the defendant did during the course of committing the 
Sexual Abuse of a Child use or threaten the victim by the use of a dangerous weapon, or 
used force, duress, violence, intimidation, coercion, menace, or threat of harm or the 
Sexual Abuse of a Child was committed during the course of a kidnapping, or caused 
bodily injury or severe psychological injury to the victim during or as a result of the 
offense, or the defendant was a stranger to the victim or made friends with the victim for 
the purpose of committing the offense, or the defendant used, showed, or displayed 
pornography or caused the victim to be photographed in a lewd condition, or the 
defendant has been previously convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving a 
sexual offense, or the defendant committed the same or similar sexual act upon two or 
more victims at the same time or during the same course of conduct, or the defendant 
committed, in Utah or elsewhere, more than five separate acts which if committed in 
Utah would constitute an offense described in Title 76, Chapter 5, and were committed at 
the same time, or during the same course of conduct, or before or after the instant 
offense, or the defendant occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim, or 
the defendant encouraged, aided, allowed or benefited from acts of prostitution or sexual 
acts by the victim with any other person or sexual performance by the victim before any 
other person, or the defendant caused the penetration, however slight, of the genital or 






AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm 
Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about Jamuary 1, 1999 through 
December 31, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(4), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a 
party to the offense, touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a 
female child, or otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take 
indecent liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial 
emotional or bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger 
than 14 years of age, further that the defendant did during the course of committing the 
Sexual Abuse of a Child use or threaten the victim by the use of a dangerous weapon, or 
used force, duress, violence, intimidation, coercion, menace, or threat of harm or the 
Sexual Abuse of a Child w7as committed during the course of a kidnapping, or caused 
bodily injury or severe psychological injury to the victim during or as a result of the 
offense, or the defendant was a stranger to the victim or made friends with the victim for 
the purpose of committing the offense, or the defendant used, showed, or displayed 
pornography or caused the victim to be photographed in a lewd condition, or the 
defendant has been previously convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving a 
sexual offense, or the defendant committed the same or similar sexual act upon two or 
more victims at the same time or during the same course of conduct, or the defendant 
committed, in Utah or elsewhere, more than five separate acts which if committed in 
Utah would constitute an offense described in Title 76, Chapter 5, and were committed at 
the same time, or during the same course of conduct, or before or after the instant 
offense, or the defendant occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim, or 
the defendant encouraged, aided, allowed or benefited from acts of prostitution or sexual 
acts by the victim with any other person or sexual performance by the victim before any 
other person, or the defendant caused the penetration, however slight, of the genital or 
anal opening of the child by any part or parts of the human body other than the genitals or 
mouth. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 





PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your Affiant bases this Information upon the following: 
1. The statement of M.B., DOB 6/17/1990, that when she was approximately 9 years 
old, when she lived on Elm Street in Salt Lake County, her older step-brother, JASON TYLER 
HAMBLIN began sexually abusing her. She states that he began by touching her breasts and 
rubbing her vaginal area. M.B. states that HAMBLIN on separate occasions digitally penetrated 
her vagina and would bite her breasts. M.B. states that HAMBLIN had anal intercourse with her 
and caused her anus to bleed. M.B. states that HAMBLIN had anal intercourse with her 
numerous times. She also states that HAMBLIN put an M&M candy container and a "dildo" in 
her anus. M.B. states that HAMBLIN also had vaginal intercourse with her numerous times and 
that it hurt and she bled profusely. M.B. states that HAMBLIM put his mouth on her vagina and 
would force her to perform oral sex on him. M.B. states that these things occurred numerous 
times a week and that HAMBLIN stopped when he went to prison on unrelated charges, around 
the time M.B. turned 10 years old in 2000. 
Z^^f/T* 1L^£/ 
Affiant 




Authorized for presentment and filing: 
LOHRA L. MILLER, District Attorney 
J^^J.yUJ^ 
Deputy District Attorney 
October 27, 2006 
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Amended/ww/March 26, 2007 
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TTTRA^TT S* I I 
Q Could you tell us about the first time? 
A I just, I remember that I had to hold myself up, like 
I had to hold myself on my hands and my knees, and it was so 
hard for me to — it felt like — I don't know how to explain 
it. Like I was more — I couldn't take myself away from the 
situation, and so I was more in tune, I was more there. And he 
just started having anal intercourse with me. And I couldn't 
go to the bathroom afterwards. And I remember when I tried it 
like cracked and bled. 
Q What cracked and bled? 
A My anus. 
Q Did he say anything to you the first time that 
happened? 
A He never said anything. All he ever said was, Shh, 
be quiet. 
Q By nanal intercoursen what do you mean? What part of 
him went into what part of you? 
A His penis went into my anus. 
Q Did that happen once or more than once? 
A It happened more than once. And there were objects 
involved sometimes. 
Q Could you tell us about the objects? 
A You know the M&M tubes that the little, mini MSM's 
come in? That was shoved up my ass. 
Q Who did that? 
16 
A Jason. 
Q Anything else? 
A And a dildo. 
0 Where did he put that? 
A My anus. 
Q Did that happen once or more than once? 
A The objects just once. But himself multiple times. 
Q Did he ever put his mouth on any part of your body 
other than your vagina? Did he ever put his mouth on your 
breasts or anything like that? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Judge, I am going to object on the 
grounds it is leading. I think he can ask her what else 
happened. He has asked her that now. He is starting to lead 
her in terms of what particular acts he is contending allegedly 
occurred. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Neill) Did he ever put his mouth on any other 
part of your body? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever do anything to try to get out of the 
situation or to prevent him from coming into your room? 
A I had my shoelaces, and I would take my shoelace out 
of my shoe. And in my roam there was a wooden handle in the 
inside, and there was no lock on the inside. You can only be 
locked in from the outside. I took my shoelace and I tied it 
1*7 
1 Q But there were apparently other objects that he did 
2 stick inside you? 
3 A Yes. 
4 I THE COURT: Could you answer out loud, please. 
5 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
6 Q (By Mr. Nakamura) Those were two, the M£M container 
7 and the dildo; is that right? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q I'm sorry to keep having to go over these areas, but 
10 I have to ask. But in terms of where he put those, where did 
11 he actually put those into? 
12 A My anus. 
13 Q One time each with each object? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q There were no other objects other than those two? 
16 A No. 
17 Q You have indicated that he also put his penis inside 
18 your anus. 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Did he do that on the same time that he did the MSM 
21 or the dildo? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Those were separate occasions? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Do you recall if when the M&M container or the dildo 
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FINDINGS AND ORDER 
Case No. 061907251 
Honorable Randall Skanchy 
On Thursday, October 11, 2007, a Motion Hearing was held before this Court to 
determine the admissibility of evidence which the Defendant seeks to introduce at trial. 
The State was represented by Robert G. Neill, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake 
County, and Mr. Hamblin, who was present, was represented by Mr. Blake Nakamura. 
The Court reviewed several motions and memoranda submitted by the Defendant as well 
as responses filed by the State. The Court heard arguments and also received evidence in 
the form of a portion of an audio-recorded forensic interview ("the interview"') conducted 
by Ms. Amanda Wilson of the alleged-victim Mandi Boyd (Ms. Boyd). After resolving 
various issues themselves, the parties left the Court with the following issues to decide: 
1) Whether statements made by Ms. Boyd regarding an alleged incident of sexual abuse 
perpetrated against her when she was four or five years old are admissible; 2) Whether 
statements made by Ms. Boyd regarding her feelings about what happens to the 
Defendant and another step-brother, Adam Boyd, who is also the subject of a criminal 
3spL:ty^Xo] TK 
prosecution, are admissible, and 3) Issues relating to statements made by Ms. Boyd 
during the interview which the Defendant claims are inconsistent, and the purpose and 
identity of the subject of the interview. 
After considering the evidence, arguments and the applicable Utah Rules of 
Evidence, the Court makes the following Findings and Order with regard to issues one 
and two, but reserves ruling with regard to issue three. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
1. On October 31, 2006, the State filed numerous sexual-offense charges against the 
Defendant in this case. All of the charged offenses are alleged to have occurred 
between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000, when Ms. Boyd was 
approximately nine and ten years old. The Defendant seeks to introduce 
statements Ms. Boyd made during the interview where Ms. Boyd referred to an 
alleged incident of sexual abuse which occurred nearly thirteen years ago, when 
Ms. Boyd was approximately four or five years old. Ms. Boyd stated that this 
particular incident was perpetrated by her step-brother, Adam Boyd, then 
corrected herself and stated it was the Defendant, not Adam Boyd, who 
perpetrated this particular alleged-abuse. This incident was first reported to law 
enforcement when Ms. Boyd wras thirteen years old and is barred from 
prosecution by the statute of limitations. The Court finds that statements made by 
Ms. Boyd regarding this particular incident, when she was four or five years old, 
are not the subject of any of the charged offenses and any testimony or cross-
examination associated with a matter that's not a subject of the charged 
allegations is irrelevant pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 402 and is additionally 
barred by Utah Rule of Evidence 412. Therefore any correction or contradiction 
on a piece of infonnation associated with this alleged incident that occurred 
several years prior are not relevant and are hereby ordered inadmissible. 
2. The second issue the Court considered is whether the Defendant may inquire of 
the alleged victim, Ms. Boyd, about statements she made indicative of her anger 
towards the Defendant and preference or sympathy towards her step-brother, 
Adam Boyd. The Court finds that any statements associated with bias or 
prejudice are subject to cross-examination, are admissible, and are not violative of 
Utah Rule of Evidence 412. 
3. The Defendant, pursuant to his Motion, has raised additional issues regarding the 
admissibility of evidence pertaining to alleged inconsistencies in Ms. Boyd's 
statements and whether Adam Boyd or the Defendant was to be the subject of the 
the interview with Ms. Boyd. At the present time, the Court reserves any order 
regarding the admissibility of these issues until the issues are raised, if at all, 
during trial. 
DATED this £<» day of Newmbfl), 2007' 
BY THE COURT: 
RAND AIL N{ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE Jt< 
Approved as to form: 
Blake Nakamura 
Attorney for Defendant 
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And we would ask the court to rule that, under 412, 
mention of the victim1 s sexual -- any sort of abuse would be 
irrelevant and confusing for this jury. 
THE COURT: Let me — just before you — before I let 
you go, let's walk through the 412 for just a minute and see 
how applicable it is to the four areas we've been talking 
about. 
412 simply requires that it's not admissible in a 
criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct, and it 
sets forth the exceptions: But the evidence is not admissible 
-- "evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged 
in other sexual behavior." 
So what you argue to the court today is that sexual 
behavior, that is incident to sexual abuse, that occurred 
between her and her brother Adam, as opposed to her stepbrother 
Jason, would be barred by this rule; correct? 
MR. NEILL: Correct. And as well as we would ask 
that it's irrelevant as well. 
THE COURT: All right. However, as this case 
unfolds, you can certainly ask the victim to provide testimony 
about sexual abuse that occurred between her and the defendant, 
and she is subject to cross-examination as to those incidents. 
And indeed she would be subject to any 
cross-examination associated with incidents of sexual abuse 
perpetrated by — alleged to have been perpetrated by Jason in 
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this particular case. 
In particular, all of that arises from this 
interview, which she has a mixed summary of sexual abuse that 
takes place with one individual and with another. Is that 
correct? 
MR. NEILL: Correct. 
THE COURT: And at the end of it, she at least gives 
her own impressions about her particular feelings about why she 
would like to see Adam not be punished, but why she doesnTt 
care about Jason. Is that correct? 
MR. NEILL: Yes. 
THE COURT: That would be — let's deal with that one 
first. That would certainly be subject to cross-examination. 
And wouldn't it fall within a proscription associated with Rule 
412 for barring it, because it simply goes to motive or bias? 
Correct? 
MR. NEILL: Correct. 
THE COURT: And it has to be put in some context. 
That context would be, "well, you were interviewed about your 
sexual abuse associated with Jason, correct?" And that's how 
it comes up. Is that right? 
MR. NEILL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Now she'll also be subject to 
cross-examination associated with -- well, "when did you first 
report this? How did you report it?" And there's going to 
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1 be — I?m trying to think through how this court would work 
2 through an application of 412 associated with the testimony 
3 that comes in. The beginning of the interview process, the 
4 I fact that she was there, that's not going to be prohibited by 
5 412. Is that right? 
6 MR. NEILL: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: So ultimately, if, in her initial 
8 rendition to the therapist, she is there to talk about abuse 
9 perpetrated by her brother Adam, it comes in. I mean that's a 
10 statement that's more likely than not to be elicited on direct 
11 examination, to which she is subject to cross-examination. 
12 Right? 
13 MR. NEILL: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: "When did this first come in?" "In an 
15 interview I gave to a sexual counselor, abuse counselor." 
16 "When did that interview take place? What did you tell her?" 
17 Mr. Nakamura gets up to cross-examine and says, 
18 "didn't you identify someone else, too; that you had been the 
19 subject of sexual abuse by other individuals not identified 
20 here in this case?" And indeed, for the purpose of following 
21 that discussion, "didn't you meet with a counselor specifically 
22 to talk about that abuse?" Right? Is that — have we passed 
23 412 at this point? 
24 Where does 412 come in in the context of the court — 
25 Mr. Nakamura wanting to carry forward and the right he has to 
confront the witness on that particular issue? 
MR. NEILL: Well, anticipating — 
THE COURT: Because it is evidence offered to prove 
that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior. That 
certainly falls within 412. 
MR. NEILL: I was planning to craft my direct 
examination very narrowly, and I mean my attempt would -- I 
think I could also ask her, you know, "during that interview, 
did you disclose allegations against the defendant?" I think I 
could certainly avoid any mention of the defendant -- or, I 
mean, excuse me, of Adam Boyd. 
THE COURT: Then the exception to this, specifically 
things associated with why -- there may be argument that Mr. 
Nakamura could make today -- and that is evidence of specific 
incidents of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to 
prove that a person other than the accused was the source of 
the injury, or other physical evidence. 
Typically that arises in the context of, you know, a 
single incident; an incident where, in interviews with this 
person, "this person, Person X did this," and you can get that 
information by examining the sort of physical evidence that may 
come from it. There may be physical evidence available. But 
it still falls within this exception, unless I'm misreading it. 
Your only argument is it's not relevant; it's not 
charged. 
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1 MR. NEILL: That also, and I think the way I read 
2 that exception is that it is specific to a finding of physical 
3 evidence, whether itTs semen, injury -- and I would assume 
4 that's referring to bruises or some sort of physical injury 
5 and/or other physical evidence. In this case, we have none of 
6 that. We have no one to compare, no semen samples to compare 
7 or bruises. It's very old. 
8 My reading of that is that that would fall in to play 
9 if there were some physical evidence that they were contesting. 
10 THE COURT: How about then Exception B, evidence of 
11 specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim 
12 with respect to the person accused of the incident -- that's 
13 Mr. Hamblin in this case -- an incident that occurred three or 
14 four years prior? I guess that only comes in if it's offered 
15 by the accused and/or the prosecution brings it up. In a 
16 sense, it's not an issue in this particular case. Anything 
17 else you wish to say? 
18 MR. NEILL: No. 
19 THE COURT: You have the last word, if there's 
20 anything further. 
21 MR. NAKAMURA: Judge, I think I'm understanding the 
22 court's thoughts on this one. And I want to address the third 
23 issue, if you will, that I have raised in the motion. It's the 
24 issue we talked about that we may have to wait for trial to 
25 develop. 
I understand where the State's concerns are. I 
certainly understand the court's, and I understand 412. 
Clearly, it would preclude me from going in to all the details 
of the sexual abuse that happened; no question about that. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. NAKAMURA: What I'm really saying on Point Three 
is that I'm comfortable waiting to trial to raise that because 
of what I'm anticipating happening; and this is what I think 
would occur. 
She'll be examined by the State, asked questions 
about what she contends Jason did to her. And then, as she 
describes that incident -- but previously she has described 
Adam committing acts against her. 
It would seem that, under those circumstances, I 
certainly am able to cross-examine her about the fact she had 
previously said X was considered by Adam. Is that a fair 
reading of what the thought is on at least the third point? 
THE COURT: Yes, the factual scenario you have given 
me, though, is one that's in issue. 
MR. NAKAMURA: Right. Because that's I think why we 
have to wait until we get to trial because we have to see 
exactly what evidence -- what she says, frankly, and what she 
says that there's an allegation against Jason that she has 
previously described as being committed by Adam. And if that's 
the case, it would seem to me that right to confront is very 
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1 much real. And I don't really have to get in to sexual 
2 behavior, and I'm not doing it for 412 purposes. 
3 But at that point, Ifm entitled to show identity 
4 issues. And 412 doesn't even apply, I would argue at that 
5 point. 
6 But that's really what I was trying to get in with 
7 Point Three. And if it comes out that way, I can't see how I 
8 wouldn't be permitted to at least bring it to the jury's 
9 attention. That's the only point I wanted to make on Point 
10 Three, because I think that clearly is what may well happen. 
11 And I want to be able to respond to that. 
12 Perhaps the court could give us some guidance if we 
13 ever get to that point. But I think if it was something 
14 contrary, that we could maybe take a break, bring it to the 
15 court's attention so the court can make a decision at that 
16 point whether it be that we have the described evidence, that 
17 it was by Adam on a different occasion. 
18 THE COURT: The parties certainly are subject to 
19 impeachment or cross-examination on material inconsistent 
20 statements. This case presents a particular issue in terms of 
21 the factual pattern, if I understand the parties today, that 
22 relates to an incident that occurred three or four years prior 
23 to what might otherwise be the relevant and germane allegations 
24 associated with this particular information. 
25 And therefore the issue becomes two-fold. First, 
whether or not itfs relevant at all. Thatfs an argument that I 
think is made by the State, and seems to be persuasive, at 
least to this court at this time, in terms of the way we're 
proceeding. 
Any testimony and cross-examination associated with a 
matter that's not a subject of these allegations is not 
relevant. And therefore correction or contradiction on a piece 
of information associated with incidents that occurred three or 
four years prior, and that is not subject to charge in this 
particular case, are not relevant and wouldn't be delved into 
at the time of trial, precluding the ability to ask questions 
associated with that. 
However, of course in the context of the testimony, 
if the testimony comes in, it is certainly subject to being 
reopened, because it's been made a matter of testimony in the 
trial proceedings, et cetera. 
I think I can — I think there's some guidelines I 
can give you today associated with at least the four points. 
I have put four, but it seems that two and three kind 
of blend themselves together; maybe it's one and two. And 
here's my preliminary ruling, subject to modification at the 
time of trial. 
And that is statements associated with the fact of 
bias or prejudice are certainly subject to cross-examination. 
Therefore, indications she, in the context of an interview, 
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1 indicated she preferred Jason to or as opposed to Adam are 
2 subject to examination, direct and/or cross, and would not be 
3 violative of 412. 
4 I That, as is present, presently represented by the 
5 parties, the burden required by the defendant in this 
6 particular case to show relevance associated with 
7 cross-examination on an incident that occurred when she was 
8 three or four — which is not, as the parties represent to the 
9 court today, at least the State does, subject to these 
10 allegations in this particular complaint — would not be 
11 relevant and would also be barred by Rule 412. And therefore a 
12 correction associated with it would be as well. 
13 The issue associated with Number three, and that is 
14 she went to the interview and stated at the beginning of the 
15 interview that this was to be interviewed about somebody other 
16 than this individual, and then proceeded, in the interview, to 
17 give testimony associated with somebody else, is a little more 
18 problematic for the court. 
19 And I don't think that todayr at the present posture 
20 of where we are, it?s an important issue — it may overshadow 
21 the rest of these — but that I can give you the ruling. We 
22 may just ultimately have to reserve that until we get to trial. 
23 But it would seem to me that, in some context, I 
24 could foresee that that, artfully handled, could come in 
25 without an appropriate objection to Rule 412, or for that — or 
412 rules, or for the objection to be sustained if itfs handled 
correctly. Does that help at all? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Judging is tough, and this is how you 
iianuj-S it. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure I can — that's why 
I've always recognized the fact that the heavy lifting in any 
court is done by the parties who sit at counsel table. And I 
recognize that. You have tremendous responsibilities and 
burdens, and I just get to make the calls from the sidelines as 
I may be required to do so. 
I have, I think, articulated in a manner in which the 
parties can perhaps come to the preparation of an order. I'll 
ask counsel for the State to prepare that order. Mr. Neill, 
you'll do that. We'll have that as an order associated with 
evidence as it may be received at the time of trial. Okay? 
Are there any other matters we can handle today? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Judge, there is one other matter. 
It's kind of a housekeeping one. It's the trial setting. 
We've got the trial setting I think on the 5th of December, and 
that was set with the understanding that was a City trial date 
but that you guys may be bumped if they had other matters to 
go, but — 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not certain we bump City 
matters if we have somebody in custody and who's charged with 
felony offenses, but go ahead. 
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Assigned to: R. Neill (Tuesday) 
DAO# 06019648 
AMENDED 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 061907251FS 
The undersigned under oath states on information and belief that the defendant 
committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
RAPE OF A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through September 23, 2001, in violation of Title 
76, Chapter 5, Section 402.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, had sexual intercourse 
with a child under the age of 14 years at the time of the offense. 
COUNT II 
RAPE OF A CHILD, a Firs^Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, i n S ^ t a k e County, Statef^" 
of Utah, on or abtfut January 1, 1999 through September 23^2$$!, in violation of Title 
76, Chapter/5; Section 402.1, Utah Code Annotate^^9D3, as amended, in that the 
defendarjt^JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a partv^Wme offense, had sexual intercourse 




COUNT IHf <*" 
SODOMY UPON A CHILD, a First Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street , in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through September 23, 2001, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 403.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, engaged in a 
sexual act upon or with a child under the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the 
actor or the child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either 
participant. 
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n ^ i n ^ ^ i n ^ i h e genitals or anus of the 
or anus of either person^r&axdless of the sex of either 
COUNT IX 
SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a Second Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through September 23, 2001, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, 
touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a female child, or 
otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take indecent 
liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial emotional or 
bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any 
person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger than 14 years 
of age. 
couNT-ar ^ 
SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a Second Degree Felony, at 1015 East Elm Street in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 1, 1999 through September 23, 2001, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404.1(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, a party to the offense, 
touched the anus, buttocks or genitalia of a child, the breasts of a female child, or 
otherwise took indecent liberties with a child, or caused the child to take indecent 
liberties with the defendant or another with the intent to cause substantial emotional or 
bodily pain to any person, or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any 
person regardless of the sex of any participant, and the child was younger than 14 years 
of age. 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ROBERT G. NEILL, Bar No. 8439 
Deputy District Attorneys 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JASON TYLER HAMBLEN, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND DATES 
ON INFORMATION 
Case No. 061907251 
Hon. Randall N. Skanchy 
The State of Utah, by and through its attorney, ROBERT G. NEILL, Deputy District 
Attorney, hereby moves this court, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(d), to permit 
the dates on the Information filed in this case, to be amended to read from January 1, 1999 
through September 23, 2001. 
BRIEF STATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTS 
On April 25, 2006, Child Forensic Interviewer Amanda Wilson interviewed 15 year-old 
M.B. at the North Idaho Behavioral Health Juvenile Unit. M.B. disclosed to Ms. Wilson that the 
defendant had sexually abused her multiple times when she was a child. M.B. states that these 
incidents began when she was nine and lasted until she was ten years old. She stated that they 
occurred while she lived at 1015 Elm Avenue in Salt Lake County, a residence which her family 
rented. Both of M.B.'s parents passed away prior to this interview and therefore could not be 
resources for any dates. Based upon M.B/s statements, the State's Information reads "on or 
about January L 1999 through December 31, 2000," which includes M.B.'s ninth year and half 
of her tenth year. 
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On February 19, 2008, the defendant filed a Notice of Alibi Defense. The defendant 
alleges that between April 1999 and October 2000 he had periodic contact with the police in 
New York State. 
The State has presented this information to M.B. who will testify that the facts supporting 
the incidents of abuse are the same but the abuse could have happened into the year 2001. 
ARGUMENT 
I. This Court Should Permit the State to Amend the Information Because Utah 
Law Permits the State to Amend an Information Any Time Prior to Verdict. 
This Court should permit the State to amend the dates in the information because under 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(d): "The court may permit an indictment or information to be 
amended at any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." Because no additional or different 
offenses are being charged, this Court should permit the requested amendment of dates. Utah 
appellate courts have upheld trial courts' decisions to permit amending the dates of offenses on 
informations prior to verdict, particularly on child sex abuse cases. 
In State v. Taylor, 116 P.3d 360 (Utah 2005), the defendant was convicted of Rape of a 
Child and Sodomy Upon a Child. The State's Information alleged that the offenses occurred uon 
or about November 1, 2002 through January 9, 2003."' Id at 361. During her testimony, the 
victim was imprecise on dates and times and the State moved to amend the information, 
following her testimony, to expand the range of dates by six months. Id. The trial court allowed 
the amendment and the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial courts' decision. The Supreme 
Court stated: 
We have also acknowledged that in child sexual abuse prosecutions, identifying the 
specific date, time, or place of the offense is often difficult owing to the inability of 
young victims to provide this information. Responding to the realities of cognitive 
development, we have been less demanding of exact times and dates when young 
children are involved. We have noted that [i]f we were to hold that ... no offense could 
be charged because the alleged victim is too young to testify with certainty concerning 
the time, dates, or places where the abuse occurred, we would leave the youngest and 
most vulnerable children with no legal protection. An abuser could escape prosecution 
merely by claiming that the child's inability to remember the exact dates and places of 
the abuse impaired the abuser's ability to prepare an alibi defense. Id at 363. 
Similarly in this case, Ms. Boyd is recalling events which occurred when she was a child: 
nine and ten years old. Therefore, the State requests the Court to be 'less demanding of exact 
times and dates'' and permit the State to amend the information. 
II. This Court Should Permit the Amendment Because Time is Not an Element of Any 
of the Offenses Charged and Therefore the Substantial Rights of the Defendant are 
Not Prejudiced. 
This Court should permit the State to amend its information because the State is not 
required to prove the precise time the offense was committed and therefore, the substantial rights 
of the defendant are not prejudiced. In State ex Re! D T, 1134 P.3d 1148 (Utah Ct. App. 2006), 
the State charged the juvenile with Sexual Abuse of a Child, of vshich he was adjudicated. 
During cross-examination of the victim, she testified that the year of the offense could have been 
2003 or 2004. Id at 1150. On appeal, the defendant argued that the victim's "testimony was 
insufficient because she could not remember the precise year the incidents had occurred[.]" Id 
at 1151. The Utah Court of Appeals stated that: "The only element of the offense at issue was 
where [the victim] had been touched; the State did not need to prove the precise year in which 
the abuse occurred." Id. 
In State v Mar cum, 750 P.2d 599 (Utah 1988), the defendant was convicted of Sexual 
Abuse of a Child. During the trial, the victim could not recall any abuse happening on the date 
charged in the Information. The defendant argued that "the child's testimony failed to support 
the charge against him since she could not recall any abuse occurring on the date alleged in the 
information[ ]"' Id at 601. The Supreme Court stated: "Time was not an element of the offense 
that the State was required to prove."' Id. 
Similarly in this case, all of the offenses with which the defendant is charged do not 
require utime" as an element the State is required to prove. The alleged offenses occurred while 
M.B. was younger than fourteen years of age (around nine and ten years of age) and the issue of 
whether or not she was a "child" is not at issue. Therefore, this Court should permit the State to 
amend the information because the State is not required to prove the precise time the offense was 
committed and therefore, the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. 
III. This Court Should Permit the State to Amend the Information Because the 
Evidence Suggested that the Alleged-Abuse Could Have Gone Into 2001, 
Therefore, the Substantial Rights of the Defendant Are Not Prejudiced. 
This Court should permit the State to amend the Information because the evidence did 
suggest that the abuse could have happened in 2001 and therefore the substantial rights of the 
defendant have not been prejudiced. In her original interview, M.B. told Ms. Wilson that the 
defendant sexuallv abused her when she was nine and ten vears old. At the Preliminary Hearing 
M.B. testified that incidents of the sexual abuse occurred when the defendant was living at their 
house. She testified that the defendant came and lived at their house when she was nine, and that 
he began to sexually abuse her. Preliminary Hearing Transcript p. 9 - 10, 23 - 24. M.B. testified 
that the sexual abuse occurred a lot from when she was nine until he went to jail. PH p. 15. She 
testified that she thought she just turned ten or was about to turn ten when the defendant stopped 
living at their house and went to jail. Id. To defense counsel's question of how long the abuse 
continued, M.B. stated, "Fm not - Fm not really sure. Like, I think I was about ten or ten when 
he went to jail. Fm not really sure whether he went after or before, when he went to jail. 
Because when he went to jail it stopped." PH p. 24 11. 9 -10 . Records reveal that the defendant 
was arrested on September 23, 2001, for Aggravated Robbery. 
Because M.B. has repeatedly stated that she remembered the abuse stopping when the 
defendant went to jail, the evidence also supports the proposed amendment to the information: 
that the alleged-abuse continued into 2001 because that is when the defendant went to jail. 
Because the defendant had knowledge of this information, he suffers no substantial prejudice to 
his rights and the Court should permit the State's amendment. 
DATED this 25th day of February, 2008. 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney 
.*yUjt{' 
RDBERT G. NEILL 
Deputy District Attorney 
Addendum E 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 061907251 
vs. : 
JASON TYLER HAMBLIN, : Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant. : 
The Court has before it defendant Jason Hamblin's ("Mr. Hamblin") 
Motion for New Trial. The matter has been fully briefed, and the parties 
argued the matter before the Court on November 14, 2008. The matter is 
now ready for decision. 
BACKGROUND 
On February 29, 2008, after a three day jury trial, the jury 
returned guilty verdicts against Mr. Hamblin in the above-entitled matter 
on the following counts: Rape of a Child, a First Degree Felony; Sodomy 
of a Child, a First Degree Felony; and two counts of Sex Abuse of a 
Child, Second Degree Felonies. The jury acquitted Mr. Hamblin on two 
counts of Object Rape of a Child, First Degree Felonies, and two counts 
of Sodomy of a Child, First Degree Felonies. The charges arose as a 
result of alleged sexual abuse of the female victim who was nine and/or 
ten years old at the time. 
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On April 25, 2006, the victim told police during an initial 
interview that two separate people, Adam Boyd (uMr. Boyd") and defendant, 
Jason Hamblin, had sexually abused her. During this interview, she 
stated that Mr. Hamblin had abused her by inserting into her body an M&M 
candy tube, a dildo, and a lightbulb. At a subsequent preliminary 
hearing in May 2007, the victim reiterated that Mr. Hamblin had sexually 
abused her by inserting the M&M tube and the dildo into her body, but she 
made no mention of the lightbulb. From her statements, the State 
proceeded on two counts of Object Rape against Mr. Hamblin, one for the 
M&M tube and one for the dildo. In February, 2008, the State amended its 
Information against Mr. Hamblin, but proceeded on the same two counts of 
Object Rape, 
At trial, the prosecution questioned the victim about the lightbulb. 
The victim responded, uDo you not remember me telling you...that's not 
true." (Trial Transcript, Second Day Trial, page 108, lines 18-20.) Mr. 
Hamblin's counsel also questioned the victim as to the discrepancy 
between her initial interview and the preliminary hearing. The victim 
responded that she later had realized that it was Mr. Boyd who raped her 
with the lightbulb, not Mr. Hamblin. At the close of trial, the State 
amended some of the counts against Mr. Hamblin, but once again kept the 
two counts of Object Rape for the M&M tube and the dildo. The jury 
acquitted Mr. Hamblin of both counts of Object Rape. 
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Mr. Hamblin now requests a new trial citing two reasons. He argues 
that the State violated his due process right to a fair trial by 
withholding evidence that could be used for impeachment purposes and that 
he was denied a unanimous decision by an impartial jury. Rule 24(a), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows the Court to grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
LEGAL DISCUSSION 
1. The State did not Suppress Evidence that Denied Mr. Hamblin a Fair 
Trial 
The State is required to disclose to the defense all known evidence 
that may tend to negate the guilt of the accused. Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 16(a)(4); See also, State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 
1985) (citing State v. Jarrell , 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980)). Mr. 
Hamblin argues that the State violated Rule 16 by failing to disclose 
that the victim retracted her accusation that it was Mr. Hamblin who 
perpetrated the lightbulb incident. 
In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court held that suppression 
of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process where the 
evidence is material to guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
The duty to disclose applies to substantively exculpatory evidence, and 
may be used for impeachment. United States v. Baalev, 473 U.S. 667, 676 
(1985). In deciding whether due process has been violated, courts look 
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at whether the defense was provided the potentially exculpatory 
information m a timely manner, and if not, whether the information v^ as 
material and the absence of which prejudiced the defense. 
(i.) The Defense had the Opportunity to Address the Discrepancy at Trial 
At the heart of the duty to disclose is the quest for a fair tria] 
based on the totality of facts, not simply an adversarial contest between 
two sides. Carter, 707 P.2d at 662. That being said, 
[C]ourts universally refuse to overturn convictions where the 
evidence at issue is known to the defense prior to or during 
trial, where the defendant reasonably should have known of the 
evidence, or where the defense had the opportunity to use the 
evidence to its advantage during trial but failed to do so. 
State v Bisner, 2001 UT 99, % 33, 37 P.3d 1073 (2001). 
In Bisner, the defense learned of exculpatory information three days 
before trial, and the Utah Supreme Court found no Brady violation because 
the defense had had the opportunity to address the information at trial. 
The Court sustained the conviction. 2001 UT at ^20. In United States 
v Adams, 834 F.2d 632, 634-35 (7tn Cir. 1987), the prosecuuion gave 
potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense during trial but before 
the testimony of the witness presenting impeachable evidence. Again the 
reviewing court sustained the conviction because the defense had the 
opportunity during trial to recall the witness or request a continuance 
or recess. 
Mr. Hamblm cites the Knight case as an example where potentially 
exculpatory evidence was presented for the first time at trial, and tne 
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Utah Supreme Court found the defendant's due process had been violated. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) . Kniaht is easily distinguished 
from Mr. Hamblin's situation. In Knight, upon hearing of the evidence, 
the defense immediately motioned the court for a mistrial, a continuance, 
and a withdrawal of counsel. The trial court refused each motion, and 
the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the conviction. In Mr. Hamblin's 
case, it is likely that his counsel had already known of the victim's 
retraction before trial, but made no effort to bring the Court's 
attention to the supposedly new information. No Motion for a mistrial 
or continuance was made by Mr. Hamblin. 
It is unclear as to when Mr. Hamblin's counsel knew of or should 
have known of the victim's lightbulb retraction, but it certainly was 
prior to the end of trial. On one hand, the victim's statement at the 
preliminary hearing clearly omitted mention of the lightbulb in relation 
to Mr. Hamblin. Mr. Hamblin's counsel specifically asked the victim about 
the M&M container and dildo, and clarified with the victim that those 
were the only two objects used by Mr. Hamblin. (See State's Opp. at 4-5 
for excerpts from Preliminary Hearing Transcript.) Moreover, Mr. 
Hamblin's counsel indicates that he had carefully planned his case for 
trial by focusing on the "discrepancy between the complaining witness' 
initial disclosures and her testimony at the preliminary hearing." Thus, 
Mr. Hamblin's counsel knew that the victim had retracted her accusation 
as to the lightbulb and intended to use that as part of his final 
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strategy. Def. Mot. at 6. Notwithstanding this assertion, Mr. Hamblin 
appears to claim he was blind-sided with the lightbulb retraction at 
trial: 
At the trial, after defense counsel had mapped out his trial 
strategy during the opening statement and referred to the 
lightbulb, only then does defense counsel learn that there has 
been yet another turnabout with respect to which person 
perpetrated acts of sexual abuse. 
Id. at 4. The defense argues that it went into trial under the 
impression that the victim had not retracted her lightbulb statement. 
Id. at 7 and 8. 
Regardless of whether the victim's lightbulb retraction came to the 
attention of Mr. Hamblin before or during trial, Mr. Hamblin's due 
process was not violated. At trial, the State mentioned the lightbulb 
to the victim, who adamantly reminded counsel of her previous retraction. 
Mr. Hamblin's cross-examination of the victim also brought up the 
lightbulb inconsistency. It would seem that Mr. Hamblin was put out 
that the State approached the lightbulb issue first, and the victim had 
an opportunity to give explanation to the discrepancy prior to his 
questioning rather than being blind-sided by the testimony. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Hamblin was aware of the evidence at the time he 
cross-examined the victim on the stand and had an opportunity to impeach 
her inconsistent statements. He also had the opportunity at trial to 
bring his grievance to the attention of the Court, and did not do so. 
/i f» rj 
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Mr. Hamblin claims that the withholding of the lightbulb retraction 
had a substantial adverse effect on his right to a fair trial, given that 
the State's initial mention of the lightbulb foreclosed the defense from 
impeaching the victim. That the defense's trial strategy had its thunder 
stolen is not a per se violation of due process. 
(ii) The Evidence was Immaterial and did not Adversely Affect the Outcome 
Because Mr. Hamblin knew of the potentially exculpatory evidence in 
time to impeach the victim at trial, the Court does not need to address 
the next step of analysis: whether the evidence was material to the guilt 
or punishment of Mr. Hamblin. Bradv, 373 U.S. at 87. Yet even if the 
lightbulb retraction had not surfaced until after trial, the potential 
impact to Mr. Hamblin's case would have been negligible, if any. 
The Supreme Court has refined the Bradv standard for whether 
evidence is material as meaning there is reasonable likelihood that the 
result would have affected the outcome of the trial, or in other words, 
that the suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
Baalev, 473 U.S. at 678; see also, State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, H 32, 
979 P.2d 799, 812 (1999); State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 26, 114 P.3d 551 
(2005) (citing Kvles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). 
Here, even if the lightbulb retraction had not been disclosed until 
after trial and Mr. Hamblin had been precluded from using it to impeach 
the victim, the information is largely immaterial. The State charged Mr. 
Hamblin with only two charges of Object Rape, not including the 
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lightbulb The jury acquitted Mr. Hamblm on the two counts of Object 
Rape. Even if Mr. Hamblm had labored throughout the trial under the 
illusion that the victim had continued to mistakenly attribute the 
lightbulb incident to Mr. Hamblm, the jury was never asked to consider 
this issue m its deliberations. Mr. Hamblm simply cannot show that the 
victim's retraction was likely to have any significant outcome on the 
jury's ultimate decision, and therefore it did not undermine confidence 
m the trial. 
The Court finds a resemblance of Mr. Hamblm's situation to that m 
State v Pmder . Mr Pmder claimed that his murder conviction was 
undermined by the State's failure to disclose a cohort's criminal record, 
police corruption, and a witness' plea deal. The Utah Supreme Court 
disagreed and held that not only could Pmder have discovered the 
evidence through a reasonable investigation, but even if he had the 
information at trial, "we would still be hard pressed to find that the 
evidence was material, as that term is used m the Brady context." 2 005 
UT 1^H 33, 37. There, the jury was presented with information effectual Ly 
leading to the same conclusion it would have come to if presented with 
the material the defense claimed was suppressed. JTd. at H 33. In our 
case, Mr. Hamblm intended to impeach the victim to demonstrate doubt as 
to her "accuracy and reliability." (Def. Mot. at 7.) Despite Mr. 
Hamblm's claim to the contrary, both he and the State through oral 
examination presented to the jury evidence of the victim's retractior. 
STATE V. HAMBLIN PAGE 9 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The overriding concern of this Court is that Mr. Hamblin was 
afforded a fair trial and that justice prevailed in the finding of guilt. 
See, United States v. Acrurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 473 (Utah 1988). While the State is required to disclose 
to the defense potentially exculpatory evidence before the end of trial, 
and while the defense must have an opportunity to address the evidence 
to the trier of fact, the defense also has a duty to discover the 
evidence through reasonable investigation. Pinder, 2005 UT |^ 32. But 
even suppressed and undiscovered evidence will not erode confidence in 
a conviction if its disclosure and use would have been unlikely to alter 
the outcome to the extent that the accused was not afforded a fair trial. 
Mr. Hamblin cannot show that, first, he was without knowledge of the 
lightbulb retraction before or during trial, and second, that he was 
likely to receive any other outcome at trial. 
2. The Jury Decision was Unanimous and Impartial 
By 10:15 p.m. on the third and last day of trial, the jury had been 
deliberating for approximately five hours. The Court asked the jurors 
if they thought they might reach a decision within an hour; if unlikely, 
the Court would adjourn for the day and recall the jury for Monday 
morning. The foreperson indicated that an hour would suffice, and the 
jury did render its unanimous decision within the hour. 
Mr. Hamblin argues that the Court's question to the jury pressured 
the jurors to come to a unanimous decision, perhaps compromising the 
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deliberative process. His argument that "it is very likely'' that the 
verdict was compromised is unfounded speculation. 
The Court's question to the jury in no way can be seen as a coercive 
instruction. In State v. Clements, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the 
trial court's instruction to the jury as follows: 
I would sincerely hope that you can reach a verdict this 
^evening. This is not a complicated case. There's only one real 
issue here on the one count, and it's either "yes" or "no." 
You have to make up your minds, folks. 
967 P.2d 957,959 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The appeals court held that while 
a court may urge a verdict to a deadlocked jury as long as it is not 
coercive, when the jury is not deadlocked the court is free to instruct 
that the jurors must come to some consensus from among the options of 
returning at a later time to deliberate, letting the court know if they 
are deadlocked, or reaching a verdict. Jd. In the instant case, the 
jury was not deadlocked, nor was the Court's instruction at all coercive. 
The Court simply asked for an estimate of time needed and suggested that 
they return Monday morning if they felt they required much more time. 
Mr. Hamblin has asked for a new trial under Rule 24(a), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, claiming that errors of prosecutorial misconduct 
and flawed jury instruction had a substantial adverse effect upon his 
rights. For the above-mentioned reasons, the Court finds that Mr. 
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Hamblm was afforded a fair trial m line with his due process rights, 
Accordingly, Mr. Hamblm7 s Motion for New Trial is denied. 
Dated this ' .- day of December, 2008. ^y j ^ / V ^ H ^u 
RANDALL N. SKANCffi? -ku \ ^ 7 > . /V^ # 
DISTRICT COURT J U D G E V ' ' ' -""Vro" 0^ '^ 
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